On Tuesday, direct talks between high-level Israeli and Lebanese officials were held for the first time in decades. Expectations among observers were high. Soon after, President Donald Trump announced there would be a 10-day ceasefire in Lebanon, beginning tonight. This has some value in bringing immediate relief to Lebanese, if only for a few days. But it fails to capture key elements of the strategic reality in the country, some of which are quite sobering, while others offer some room for hope.
The basic foundations for a lasting ceasefire in Lebanon are weak. This is a war between Hezbollah and Israel, which happens to be taking place in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah was not privy to the ceasefire talks and takes its orders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran rather than the Lebanese government, this means Hezbollah will accept the deal on paper, because it has taken a great deal of punishment, but try its best to work around it as things settle. The problem is that Israel has learned these lessons from previous ceasefire agreements: Any ceasefire agreement to which Hezbollah would actually agree will not contain an enforcement mechanism for preventing its rearming and recovery.
Israel cares about weakening Hezbollah more than it cares about reaching agreements with the Lebanese state. This is a strategic reality the Lebanese government cannot change. Israel welcomes Lebanese words about peace, border demarcation and so on because it likes the prospect of Arab countries accepting it. But all parties understand that the Lebanese state is incapable of imposing its own laws banning Hezbollah’s militia. The Lebanese Armed Forces, even if they could do so, seem unready to confront and disarm Hezbollah.
Then there are Israel’s other imperatives, which include protecting its northern area from Hezbollah anti-tank guided missiles and creating a “security zone” in Lebanon along Israel’s border — code for militarization, depopulation and displacement. A new, permanent refugee class will strain an already teetering state, along with civil relations between the largely Shiite refugees and members of other sects who will be hosting them, despite tending to view them with contempt. Divisions between the Shiite population and Hezbollah, on the one hand, and the rest of the Lebanese population, on the other, serve Israeli interests if they also isolate Hezbollah.
The party has accepted an agreement that leaves room for it to operate in Lebanon, including by rearming, or moving and hiding existing weapons and munitions. We find it difficult to believe that Hezbollah would unilaterally break a ceasefire under the specific circumstances by attacking Israel. Instead, it would use a pause to prepare for the next round of fighting — preparations that Israel, of course, would be foolish to accept as part of a “ceasefire.”
Therein lies the problem and the real obstacle to an enduring ceasefire. Lebanon wants a ceasefire but will not disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah only accepts ceasefires that allow it to operate relatively freely, and Israel will not accept that. As a result, there cannot be a lasting, comprehensive ceasefire across Lebanon.
So are the Israel-Lebanese talks and the 10-day ceasefire completely useless? In fairness, no. Optics matter, and the optics of Lebanese and Israeli senior officials meeting publicly under U.S. sponsorship will chip away at the long-running taboo against such contact in Lebanon. There are many Lebanese who actually oppose the meeting on those very grounds for ideological reasons. That is understandable; old habits die hard, and Israel has not exactly covered itself in glory in Lebanon. For the rest of Lebanon, the value in such talks, even in the absence of a ceasefire, is simply the presence of Lebanese officials negotiating on behalf of Lebanon. Hezbollah is not in the room, and neither is Iran. It is a small, but meaningful exercise in sovereignty.
Of course, Lebanon has little leverage in any negotiation with a vastly superior military opponent, and some Lebanese have opposed the talks for this reason alone. But there is more to the talks than that. There are two camps on Israel in Lebanon. One believes Israel is an implacable foe that has its sights set on Lebanese territory and destruction, a fact stemming from what they view as its fundamentally evil nature. That would make disarming Hezbollah reckless for the Lebanese. The other camp believes Israel is waging war in Lebanon because Hezbollah is in the country. To these Lebanese, this does not excuse Israeli atrocities in Lebanon; it simply presupposes a belligerent Israel that should not be given an excuse to punish Lebanon. The latest meeting has allowed some breathing room for the latter camp, which is a subtle but important shift in the Lebanese debate, especially as opponents of Hezbollah in Lebanon face physical danger from the group.
It is a bit more difficult to get excited by Israeli sentiments. Israel continues to see Lebanon as a weak state making promises it cannot keep. It sees Lebanon through a narrow security prism, and we expect it will continue anti-Hezbollah operations regardless of any ceasefire. That said, perhaps the Lebanese outreach, which also disguises some degree of recognition, can appeal to the Israeli appetite for normalization. This is most unlikely to lead to a lasting peace, but perhaps it will result in some small breaks for Lebanon. Maybe Israel agrees to spare central Beirut from bombing. Perhaps it gives the Lebanese army some space to improve its capability and morale at Hezbollah’s expense. Perhaps some refugees will be permitted to return to their homes. This runs against the Israeli instinct to define its enemies in Lebanon with a broad brush. But perhaps the reality of diplomacy — with pressure from a U.S. administration seeking a ceasefire with Iran — can begin to crack the 80-year state of war between Israel and Lebanon.
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