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Reversing Turkey’s Falling Birth Rates Will Take More than Erdoğan Is Offering

The president has called population decline a ‘disaster’ and ‘an existential threat,’ but long-term socioeconomic pressures are resisting his government’s policy interventions

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Reversing Turkey’s Falling Birth Rates Will Take More than Erdoğan Is Offering
A baby holds a Turkish flag at the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on Oct. 29, 2026. (Ozge Elif Kizil/Anadolu via Getty Images)

On an afternoon in early July, the historic courtyard of Turkey’s oldest university was filled with dozens of dentistry students sitting for their graduation. Following the usual speech lauding their academic achievements and the virtues of pursuing service in their chosen new career, their rector used the occasion to voice his disappointment — in seeing them delay having children.

“I wish I could see many of the students graduating here today with their babies. I would love to see them come holding their children’s hands,” announced Istanbul University’s Osman Bülent Zülfikar.

The rector’s call to conceive was just one small part of the pronatalist interventions that have been sweeping the country, from a registrar’s speech at a civil marriage ceremony to advertisements that run on TV throughout Mother’s Day. The not-so-subtle push comes as Turkey faces one of Europe’s steepest declines in fertility rates, despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having said for nearly a decade that he wants households to have at least three children.

In 2025, the total fertility rate dropped to 1.4 children per woman, below the minimum 2.1 required for a population to replace itself. Alarmed at the low fertility rate (most countries that have fallen below the replacement figure have been unable to reverse course), Erdoğan declared the 10 years from 2026 until 2035 to be the “Decade of the Family and Population,” expressing hope that the country might avoid population decline, which he has referred to as a “disaster” and “an existential threat.”

“We are currently experiencing a disaster. No one who cares about this country’s future can remain indifferent to it,” he said in a 2025 speech at a symposium focused on the family, culture and art.

Meanwhile, both women who want large families and those who do not want to have children say that their family planning has been constrained by the socioeconomic pressures facing young people in the country.

Kübra Erkol, 29, had always dreamed of having a big family. When she started her family, she decided to leave her job as an educational consultant because she could not find affordable childcare. With the cost of raising and educating children also on the rise, Erkol says she and her husband cannot afford to grow their family beyond the two children they currently have, despite their desire to have one or two more. “People say money is not everything. Raising children is everything to do with money,” she told New Lines.

The latest government initiatives allocated a total of over 56 billion Turkish liras (roughly $1.12 billion) in financial assistance packages, including a one-time payment of approximately $100 for a first child and a monthly stipend of about $30 for a second child. More children trigger additional stipends until they reach the age of 5. The government has also been offering tax-free “marriage loans” for young couples, extended maternity leave from 16 to 24 weeks, and 10 days of paid paternity leave.

Yet the incentives have offered little relief for families coping with Turkey’s double-digit inflation, which has persisted for a decade. When both of Erkol’s children are accounted for, the cost of daycare is more than the minimum wage of 28,075 liras per month, and just shy of her salary as an educator, which was why she resigned and became a full-time homemaker.

Erkol said she’s lucky to have a helpful and loving husband who can afford to support their family of four and help her care for their children. But she added that if the scarce public daycare services that are available in some parts of the country were more ubiquitous, she would not have had to give up her career and the dream of having a big family. “If a woman can’t afford daycare or depend on elderly family members, her entire life depends on a man’s salary and on the belief that he will love and respect her for the rest of her life. Instead of talking about falling fertility rates, we should talk about what happens to women after giving birth,” she said.

Low birth rates are a global predicament. Nearly the entire OECD faces fertility rates below replacement level. The lone exception is Israel, which is buoyed by high birth rates in an ultra-Orthodox Jewish community that also receives state assistance. And governments that have allocated large sums to pronatalist policies — like Hungary, with over 5% of its GDP, or South Korea, which has spent over $280 billion on pronatalist policies since the mid-2000s — have not been able to reverse the decline in fertility rates.

“Successful population policy requires significant allocation of financial resources to family policy, including social services, and support for women’s need to reconcile work and children,” argues American academic Steven Philip Kramer in his book “The Other Population Crisis.”

According to Kramer’s cross-regional review, generous subsidies alone are unlikely to produce lasting increases in fertility. In countries such as Singapore, Japan and South Korea, conflicting demands created by rigid work and social norms can undermine such policies when they are not accompanied by sustained welfare support. Meanwhile, when Sweden registered a hike in births of 0.44% between 2000 and 2010, it may have been thanks in part to generous leave schemes underpinned by economic growth, but it also followed the arrival of asylum-seekers and labor migrants who had higher birth rates. Since then, Sweden’s fertility rate has hit a new low, which researchers attribute to lack of access to traditional employment benefits in the gig economy, climate anxiety and social media use.

Kramer describes the ideal “village” that it takes to raise a child. In Sweden’s case, the government acted as that village, according to Kramer: It made its population feel supported by offering 480 days of parental leave that can be taken by women and men, and dedicated a significant percentage of its gross domestic product to other policies that also take gender equality and nontraditional family structures into account. All of this took place while population growth was sustained, as Sweden took in roughly 100,000 immigrants each year, beginning in 2000.

Yet many would-be parents in Turkey think they cannot count on public services for raising children, and feel increasingly left to fend for themselves in growing cities they no longer recognize or find affordable.

At a restaurant in a hip central Istanbul district, Güneş Gültekin, a 30-year-old art curator, explained that she and her husband decided not to have children. She said they would feel unsupported, left shouldering the intense pressure of raising a child and giving it what it needs to succeed in the modern world.

“Why would I have kids? There is no one and nowhere else to count on. Our society is highly individualized, and the schools are not like they used to be,” Gültekin said. “I will have to drop everything to run around to find an affordable school that teaches at least two languages and an instrument. Even that doesn’t feel sufficient in an increasingly unstable world. The thought of this gives me a lot of stress.”

Like most countries around the world, Turkey’s society has witnessed massive transformation in one generation. When my parents grew up in the Turkey of the 1970s and 1980s, both men and women had more time and needed to spend less money on their children. A white-collar 9-to-5 job easily supported a family with three children. Private schools were an exception to the rule. People educated in most public schools used to graduate proficient in math and history, and get well-paying jobs that allowed them to own a home and raise a family. Social networks stepped in when services like subsidized childcare weren’t available. My father recounts how he spent long days playing on the street as an entire neighborhood watched out for him while my grandmother was busy with housework. That neighborhood had already been confined to our neighbors’ flats in my childhood. Today, I don’t know the names of the two toddlers who live in my building.

Much like young women, men feel that the financial burden of forming a family grows with the country’s persistent cost-of-living crisis, along with the void left by disappearing social and institutional networks. The first three young men I randomly approached for interviews in central Istanbul on a weekday were all single, and all three of them said they were putting off starting a family.

Adnan Akkılıç, a 33-year-old single man who works as a coordinator in a global pharmaceutical company, moved back to Istanbul after seven years abroad to feel rooted, closer to his parents and the city he grew up in. Though he would like his future wife to be financially independent, he fears that he will have to assume the financial responsibility of having children. Although his company grants three months of paternity leave, he thinks maternity leave in Turkey is too short and eventually pushes women out of the workforce.

“I would like at least two kids. But right now I wouldn’t be able to afford even one with my single salary if I decide to have children right now,” Akkılıç said.

Berke Sarıtaş, a 23-year-old simit (bagel) cart vendor, feels similarly. Sarıtaş said his future wife can work as she likes, but he currently earns enough to afford the life of a single person and wouldn’t have the time or money for childcare without the help of his parents, who are reluctant to support.

“They have their own lives. But I don’t plan on getting married until I’m at least 35. I earn enough for myself. I don’t want to worry about any of that yet,” Sarıtaş said.

“People treat dating like TikTok. Thank you, swipe, next!” said Yakup Timur, a 33-year-old single man who works at a buffet in a touristy Istanbul district near the Golden Horn. He said he has done the same thing. Now, with dating becoming so expensive, he has stopped looking for someone altogether and has since lost hope in starting a family.

Older generations agree that, with the influence of social media, young people expect too much too quickly. But they mainly blame the economy, as well as moral and institutional decay in Turkey, for the falling fertility rate.

“Our generation was frugal, but that era is over,” said Lütfiye, a 53-year-old mother of three. “Young people want more because the times have changed, and they have to do whatever this new era demands. The government tells people to have three children. But what are they supposed to rely on to do that?” she added. According to Lütfiye, young people are unable to earn enough to afford having big families; if it hopes to encourage them to do so, the government has to show that it values the youth population above all else.

“Thinking about second or third children is nothing but a dream in a country where I cannot see a future for my only daughter in state schools,” said Kadir Murat Çatak, a 51-year-old father of a teenager. The manager of a top-tier agricultural machinery shop, Çatak classifies himself as economically upper-middle-class and sends his daughter to a private middle school that costs 300,000 liras a year, although Çatak himself graduated from a state school and regards the education he received as comparable to today’s private schools. Today, he invests most of what he earns toward his daughter’s education, because, he said, the quality of education and safety of state schools have deteriorated over time.

“We have become a country where teachers and even children get killed at school,” Çatak said, pointing to the two school shootings that took place within two days in April in two cities in southeastern Turkey (though school shootings are exceptionally rare in Turkey). Çatak thinks the violence and decline in quality education point to a larger moral decay caused by a deteriorating sense of fairness in institutions and among politicians in the country. He believes young people are right to hold back from having children, though he finds them “too picky, perfectionist and impatient.”

With the rise of women in the workplace, a 2024 OECD report shows that female employment is positively associated with fertility in countries where women don’t have to choose between their careers and families.

Betül Özel Çiçek, deputy director-general for advocacy at the Women and Democracy Foundation (KADEM), said that as women’s participation in education and employment has expanded, the social and institutional structures supporting women’s changing roles have not evolved at the same pace.

Women’s participation in paid work has expanded without a corresponding redistribution of unpaid care responsibilities, Çiçek told New Lines: “If there is an established system of exploitation in place and an attempt is being made to perpetuate it, but that system starts to break down, then we need to talk about what exactly that means.”

KADEM, chaired by one of Erdoğan’s four children, Sümeyye Erdoğan Bayraktar, advocates for greater recognition and valuation of women’s unpaid and often invisible labor, alongside policies and institutional support that enable women to participate fully and sustainably in education and employment.

KADEM representatives also note that some of their critics call the organization’s advocacy for greater educational and professional opportunities for women into question, assuming that such opportunities are at odds with marriage and motherhood. KADEM rejects this framing, arguing that women should not have to choose between family life and education or employment, and that enabling women to contribute their skills and potential benefits societies and economies as a whole.

Historically, approaches that turned women into scapegoats for falling fertility rates at a time of big systemic changes have failed. The 19th-century Ottoman reformers of the Tanzimat movement, who sought to turn their culturally, religiously and ethnically heterogeneous empire and its decentralized administration into a modern and centralized state, pioneered the empire’s first pronatalist policies. The Tanzimat elite believed that a strong military and economic development, needed for their nation-building, lay in demographic policies that involved promoting maternity, especially for the Muslim population.

The government was convinced that abortion was the chief reason behind population stagnation in regions loyal to the empire, and gradually introduced a set of regulations that extended from prohibiting pharmacists from selling remedies and substances that would lead to miscarriages, to subjecting anyone who carried out abortions to a prison sentence, to penalizing those who did not inform the authorities after witnessing an abortion.

Prior to these regulations, the issue was unregulated at the state level and authority was vested in hospitals or religious courts. Ottoman historians Tuba Demirci and Selçuk Akşin Somel note that Hanafi Islamic law, which the Ottoman state used as one of its principal official legal sources, allowed abortion within 120 days of conception under valid circumstances, such as a family’s financial inability to support a child. They also highlight that the dominant opinion on abortion, between the 17th and 19th centuries, according to a collection of legal opinions of the mufti, Istanbul’s chief interpreter of Islamıc law, classified abortion as a sin but not a crime that should be prosecuted by an Islamic judge if it was performed with the consent of both husband and wife.

In their book, “Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940,” American anthropologist Alan Duben and Turkish population historian Cem Behar shed light on the Ottoman effort at pronatalism, and reveal parallels with the socioeconomic and political changes that are shaping today’s birth trends in Turkey.

From the late 1870s, a growing population of Muslim men spent a significant part of their adult years at war, while urban life moved from open-air neighborhoods toward apartment blocks. Big city fires significantly diminished housing stock, economic difficulties shrank wages as jobs disappeared, and more women entered the workforce to meet war-driven labor requirements. All of this dramatically transformed family lives.

Officials were commissioned across the empire to research what lay behind the widespread use of abortion, which they felt needed to be reversed. Their findings identified leading causes that push women to seek an abortion, including marital abuse, poor economic conditions and the physical toll of child-rearing. Demirci and Ottoman gender historian Gülhan Baysoy note that although abortion was available from medical providers, it was increasingly condemned in the public sphere, including in women’s magazines, describing it as an act that hurt the nation.

Despite the Ottoman authorities’ policy to reduce access to abortion, there was no rise in the fertility rate. Academics note widespread resistance to the Ottoman regulations and the rise of back-alley abortion practices.

The authorities have only recently shifted away from calling women who reject motherhood “incomplete” and toward emphasizing the need for men to support their partners in raising children. The president, who is socially conservative, initially blamed the fall in fertility rates on factors that have been “undermining traditional family values.” Over the past decade, Erdoğan and his government have named delayed marriage and childbearing, along with LGBTQ+ rights, as examples.

Women’s groups warn that policies where women are only visible as parts of a family risk dismissing the voices of women whose profiles don’t fit the official family model. “This goes as far as being denied protection by the police to lacking access to services like birth control or abortion,” said Leyla Soydinç of Women’s Shelter Association. Abortion until the 10th week of pregnancy has been legal in Turkey since 1983. Yet according to a 2020 study of abortion services, 185 out of 295 public hospitals denied women access to the procedure. Marital status was among the reasons some hospitals cited for not providing the service, denying it to unmarried women.

“There are so many criteria to fulfill to be cast as a ‘respectable’ woman,” said Yıldız Taghizade, of Women for Women’s Human Rights, who explains that not being married increases women’s chances of facing discrimination or violence. Data from the Turkish Statistical Institute shows a higher percentage of never-married and divorced women experiencing physical violence and stalking than married women.

“What kind of family are they talking about when they say ‘protecting the family’?” asked Taghizade. A family that restricts women’s and LGBTQ+ individuals’ choices “certainly doesn’t seem like a very loving family,” she added.

Ezgi, a 41-year-old music teacher, had her child at the age of 26, before divorcing her husband. She recalled the egregious treatment she often faced when she was perceived as being outside the traditional definition of a “respectable woman,” which turned lonely years of raising a daughter into a struggle for survival. “I keep having to fight back against people who talk down on me because I’m a single mother,” she said.

Ezgi recounted going to her university’s rector to ask to use the campus nursery, which catered to staff with children. The rector, Ezgi said, looked at her from head to toe and blamed her for not having strong family bonds and parents who would take care of her child after finding out that she is from Izmir, a socially liberal city in Turkey. Since university bylaws state that the nursery is for staff, and that a student can use it only at the discretion of the university, the rector did not allow her to use the nursery, and she had no recourse to appeal his decision.

The young mother knew her life was going to be difficult when she decided to leave her husband, who she said spent his money on alcohol and couldn’t help Ezgi with paying bills at times. She spent years balancing the demands of service jobs while pursuing her studies before finally earning her music degree. It was all worth the trouble. “It was important to raise my child in a house where there is peace and love,” she said.

Ezgi asked to withhold her last name to protect against more of the hostility that she sometimes still endures for being a single mom, including the disapproving looks and judgmental comments on her lifestyle.

“My daughter is my biggest source of happiness. But I would not have brought her to life if I could travel back in time,” Ezgi admitted. “Because at the end of the day, I feel the biggest responsibility for the suffering she faced.”

When Ezgi sat for her graduation nine years ago, she was already raising an 8-year-old as a single woman. Almost a decade later, Istanbul University’s dentistry students did not sit still as their rector told them that they are at the most productive age to have children. Instead, videos circulating on social media and local news showed the new dentistry students standing with their backs turned to the stage in protest.

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