Bombarded as we are with nonstop news from Israel, the United States and Iran, can we look at the 12-day war that just ended and determine a winner? Can we discern who was maneuvered and who held the initiative? These distinctions are crucial for the developments that will follow, in the Middle East and globally. With Israel, Iran and the U.S. (yes, the U.S. is also a party to this conflict now) constantly on the verge of upheaval, homage to the “complexity” of the situation can detract from any useful attempts to assess what comes next. Let us consider the three main players — Israel, Iran and the U.S. — in a way that cuts through the war of narratives.
According to the statement issued by the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, there is no doubt that Israel won. “All the goals of the operation have been realized,” wrote the author of the press release. For this reason, Israel accepted President Donald Trump’s proposed ceasefire. But what were Israel’s goals? That is a difficult question to answer. Initially, Netanyahu said that Israel faced “an imminent threat” because of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The background was the findings in a report issued in May by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear watchdog, which found that Iran was, for the first time in decades, in material violation of its nonproliferation treaty (NPT) commitments. But in the very same statement about the nuclear threat Iran posed to Israel’s safety, Netanyahu moved almost immediately to speak of Iranian intentions and potential capabilities. He said that were Iran to enrich uranium to levels required for constructing a nuclear bomb, Iran would have enough “material” to build nine or 11 bombs (it is still unclear which number is correct, or indeed if either one is correct) in “a matter of days.” This was the official reason for Israel’s unilateral, unprovoked attack on Iran.
But given that every intelligence agency in the world (and, most prominently, the office of the U.S. director of national intelligence) said that the Iranians were several years from acquiring the knowledge and equipment necessary for a bomb, the question arises: Was Netanyahu telling the truth about Iran’s imminent development of nine or 11 nuclear bombs? These agencies also said that the findings outlined in the IAEA report were not new. In fact, if the IAEA accused Iran of material violations for the first time in 20 years, and Israel, which is a nuclear power but is not a signatory to the NPT, has been accusing Iran of continuous violations of its NPT obligations, who is telling the truth?
Based on the statements and reports from the world’s leading intelligence agencies, Iran did not pose an imminent threat, which means that Israel did not appear to have a right to preempt this phantom threat by claiming self-defense. Additionally, pundits and analysts, including Israelis, said that Israel could not destroy Iran’s stockpile of fissionable material on its own. The uranium was stored deep underground and Israel was dependent on the U.S. for the “bunker-busting bombs,” known by various monikers but technically called Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs). But for more than a week, the U.S. did not join Israel in bombing Iran. The Trump administration had been pursuing talks with the Iranians over a new nuclear agreement, with both sides appearing cautiously optimistic. How did Israel plan to curtail the Iranian nuclear program without help from the Americans?
Initially, Israel primarily targeted missile sites, ostensibly attempting to prevent the Iranians from launching in retaliation. True to the classic Israeli modus operandi, its military strikes served as cover and a distraction from the true reason for this initial attack, which was to carry out assassinations. Israel is a firm believer in assassinations as a means of bringing about the collapse of its enemies. This “doctrine” has been used mostly on Palestinian organizations, with Israel targeting leaders in Fatah, Hamas and other, smaller groups. The strategy has never worked; the Palestinian organizations always found replacements for the leaders Israel killed. The one exception to this failed policy could be the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah on Sept. 27, 2024, which gave Hezbollah’s domestic opponents an opportunity to demand that the organization’s influence in Lebanon be severely constrained. But Hezbollah’s political reality was unique, operating as it did in a weak state governed through a highly factionalized system. In all other cases, when Israel attempted to destabilize dominant organizations or establishments, it failed. Since Oct. 8, 2023, Israel has killed one Hamas leader after another, but the organization continues to fight and has not been destroyed.
This time, Israel set out to assassinate the leadership of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the direct military arm of the Islamic Republic’s leadership, hoping that eliminating its senior leaders would weaken the country’s political leadership. The reason? For official Israel, everything about its enemies is either exclusively personal or fanatically ideological. The assumption that the Iranian leadership is capable of operating and envisioning its future beyond the constraints of ideology and personal gain thus seems abstract at best and dangerously naive at worst. Assassinations purport to deter personal motivations and demonstrate the failings of religious or revolutionary faith. Israel had apparently established an immense, elaborate system of operatives within Iran for the purpose of carrying out such assassinations (as well as drone attacks) when the day arrived. The day had arrived.
How could Israel reconcile its stated goal of going after the nuclear program with these numerous assassinations? That is where the talk of “regime change” made its entrance. Defense Minister Israel Katz appears to have been put in charge of messaging on this front. When Israel’s bombings caused damage primarily to Iranian civilians rather than to military targets, Katz amplified the message that Israel was after comprehensive regime change. That was the reason he gave for Israel’s bombing of Evin Prison in Tehran, notorious for its torture of political prisoners. But Israel’s bombing only worsened conditions for the prisoners at Evin; the New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran published a letter from political prisoners held in Evin who said they had had nowhere to shelter during the bombing and that several of them had been injured. The organization also said that the prison infirmary had been severely damaged. Meanwhile, a judiciary spokesperson said that many prisoners had been moved to unspecified locations. These facts undermined Israel’s claim to be committed to toppling the Islamic Republic.
Israel did not want anything from Iran, per se. What the Netanyahu government and the army wanted most was to make the world forget about Gaza. Before the strikes on Iran, the long-simmering domestic opposition to continuing the war in Gaza appeared to be coming to a boil. Meanwhile, global momentum was shifting. Netanyahu needed a distraction that would realign not just Israeli citizens but the entire world around his leadership. Recasting Israel as a force for good — the power that could destroy an evil regime’s nuclear capabilities as well as the regime itself — was the only antidote he could find to the implications of Israel’s toxic campaign in Gaza, which is widely considered genocidal by experts and nongovernmental organizations. This was where the U.S. and Trump came in. Netanyahu believed that if he could persuade Trump to side with Israel in its unilateral war on Iran, the Israeli prime minister could jump-start the process of this global realignment. Did he succeed?
While the U.S. did attack Iranian nuclear sites with MOPs, the answer is far from a decisive “yes.” Trump repeatedly stressed his desire for a deal with Iran. He even revealed that Iran’s June 23 bombing of a U.S. military base in Qatar was coordinated with the Qataris and the Americans. Trump appears to have ordered the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear sites in an attempt to stir movement toward a deal between the U.S. and Tehran. His commitment to Israel was based on the Trumpian division of the world between “winners” and “losers,” meaning he wanted to see whether Israel could pull off a victory. If it could, he might join more fully, so that he could share the glory and take some credit. If it couldn’t, Trump would distance himself from the Israeli attacks and strive for a deal that would also satisfy the growing criticism from the right wing of the “Make America Great Again” movement, which believes that “America first” means an end to U.S. involvement in foreign wars.
Trump applied the same thinking and policy to the war in Gaza. He made several gestures of support toward Israel, but he also made it clear that Israel was in many ways on its own. The strikes on the Iranian nuclear sites did not ensure that Iran no longer had the enriched uranium required for bombs. The Americans confirmed as much. But Trump doesn’t care. He did his bit, and now he can move on to securing what he sees as American interests. He does not trust Netanyahu and was not maneuvered by Netanyahu into allying with Israel in a war against Iran. If Israel believes otherwise, it will be unpleasantly surprised.
How has Iran emerged from this 12-day war? Bombed and bruised, no doubt, but also surprisingly stable. Despite the talk of regime change, with Israel positing that by weakening the regime it was creating an opportunity for a popular uprising that would topple it, the Islamic Republic was able (after the initial shock) to replace its slain leaders and commanders. Despite the chaos throughout the country, no clearly defined opposition rose in rebellion. This is partly because there is no organized opposition in Iran and partly because, although many Iranians are highly critical of the regime, they appear to prefer the devil they know over chaos.
Perhaps most importantly, despite Israel’s relentless targeting of Iranian launching sites, Iranian missiles penetrated Israel’s famed air-defense systems, causing real and serious damage to the Israeli heartland. Iran was quick to ask for a ceasefire because it understood that incessant Israeli bombings could potentially destabilize the Islamic Republic. Still, the Iranian people rallied around the flag, seeing the Israeli attacks as a war against sovereign Iran rather than against the regime. This was not a victory for Iran, but it was far from a defeat.
Israel fought Iran as it fought Gaza, heedless of consequences or any international rules. In doing so, Israel subjugated itself to the most immediate of short terms. There is every reason to assume that the war against Iran will continue to haunt Israel in the foreseeable future, whether via continued rounds of hostility or because Israel sees itself regionally ostracized as a consequence of having initiated a destabilizing war that did not achieve its objectives.
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