Five years ago, millions of Algerians took to the streets in a peaceful nationwide movement called the Hirak, demanding the departure of then-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime and a profound democratic change.
The Hirak halted two planned presidential elections in April and July 2019 before the regime pushed through the December 2019 vote. Backed by the military and then-Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was declared the winner in a widely contested election with a historically low official turnout (40%).
But now, as Algeria approaches its Sept. 7 presidential election, a widespread indifference permeates the nation’s politics. The outcome seems predetermined, with Tebboune heavily favored to win reelection. This widespread apathy contrasts sharply with the turbulence surrounding the 2019 presidential election.
Back in March, the 2024 election that was scheduled for December was suddenly moved up to September. This maneuver was intended to allow a discreet summer campaign, reducing the risks of disruptions. Additionally, the limited number of candidates approved by the Independent National Authority of Elections (ANIE) — just three out of 16 potential contenders — the support garnered by Tebboune from the small pro-regime parties and his campaign slogan, “For a Triumphant Algeria,” leave no doubt: Continuity is the goal, and the incumbent president is the face of it.
Since 2019, Tebboune has promoted the advent of a “New Algeria” as a political narrative promising transformative reforms that would put an end to the corrupt and authoritarian Bouteflika era (1999-2019). For nearly two decades, Algeria rode the wave of soaring gas revenue, funding vast infrastructure projects, boosting wages, and rolling out social initiatives like housing programs and youth loans. Yet, behind this prosperity, authoritarianism prevailed, corruption flourished, and powerful business networks emerged, tightly connected to the inner circle of the Bouteflika family.
Five years after Tebboune came to power, his mandate appears bleak. Rather than delivering the much-needed democratic renewal sought by the Hirak, Tebboune’s term has been characterized by a significant regression in civic liberties, an increasing constitutional and political role for the military, a turbulent foreign policy record, and persistent social despair among the youth.
Algeria is witnessing the worst crackdown on rights and liberties since the civil war in the 1990s, a bloody decade that claimed over 200,000 lives. Ongoing repression has been carried out through several strategies that the authorities have employed since June 2019, starting with the instrumentalization of the Amazigh flag to sow division. During the marches, thousands of Algerians raised the Amazigh flag, a powerful emblem of an identity enshrined in the constitution and recognized as a national language since 2016 — a fundamental part of the nation’s soul. Yet, despite this official recognition, the flag was banned from protests under the claim that Algeria could have only one flag. In July 2019, over 40 people were arrested, with some detained, for carrying this symbol of cultural pride, sparking deeper questions about the limits of Algeria’s pluralism.
Starting in the fall of 2019, the crackdown intensified with growing harassment by the security services and the judiciary of opponents, the detention of critical voices, and the implementation of a series of draconian law revisions. By the end of 2019, about 60 prisoners of conscience had been documented by Algerian human rights organizations.
Four months after Tebboune’s election in December 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic became a convenient pretext to tighten the authorities’ grip on dissent. As protests raged on despite the contentious 2019 vote, the ensuing lockdown abruptly silenced the streets. Seizing this moment, the ruling authorities escalated their repression, jailing activists on dubious charges of threatening national security, often for nothing more than online posts. In a move shrouded in secrecy, a sweeping amendment to the Penal Code was rushed through in April 2020 without public scrutiny. This draconian legislation quickly became a tool to stifle free speech, with many citizens convicted on spurious grounds like “fake news” or receiving “foreign funding.”
A mix of relentless repression, pandemic restrictions, and a growing weariness within the population thwarted efforts to reignite the movement between February and May 2021. In June 2021, the regime further entrenched the repression by expanding terrorism charges through Article 87, frequently used against peaceful dissent. Ordinance No. 21-08, issued on June 8, 2021, broadens the definition of terrorist or subversive acts, building upon the framework from the 1990s. The new definition encompasses any efforts aimed at “seizing power or […] altering the system of governance through unconstitutional means.” This in effect criminalizes the Hirak movement’s calls for a democratic transition outside the established constitutional order.
This new provision provides a legal basis for the May 18, 2021, announcement by the High Council of Security (HCS) — an advisory body made up of top military, security and executive officials — classifying the pro-democratic movement Rachad as well as the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (a region of Algeria) as “terrorist” entities. The first is an Islamist organization based in the U.K. and Europe that has contributed to the Hirak movement, while the second is an independent organization that is not associated with the Hirak. This decision marks a turning point in the state’s approach to dissent, raising critical concerns about the shrinking space for political expression and the broader implications of labeling opposition movements as threats to national security. Hundreds of individuals, including lawyers, journalists and scholars, often with no direct ties to these organizations, have been prosecuted or condemned, raising concerns from human rights organizations and U.N. special rapporteurs (independent experts).
The political weaponization of terrorism charges has become increasingly common and more aggressive. A growing number of prosecutions and detentions are based on alleged affiliation with one of the named organizations or for glorifying terrorism, targeting individuals from diverse political backgrounds — particularly those involved in the popular Hirak movement. This broadening of the net signals a worrying escalation in the state’s efforts to silence dissent, blurring the lines between legitimate political activism and criminality.
This tactic fosters a climate of fear among mobilized citizens, fueled by relentless police and judicial harassment, and amplified by intense media propaganda. The result is not only the criminalization of dissent but also an attempt to stifle any form of opposition through intimidation and repression.
Moreover, independent civil society associations, media and political parties have paid a heavy price. Two long-standing human rights organizations disappeared in the repressive tornado. The Youth Action Gathering (RAJ), a well-known and active youth-led association, was disbanded in October 2021, a decision upheld by the State Council in February 2023. The Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), the oldest human rights organization in the country, met the same fate in June 2022. Additionally, the offices of Radio M and Maghreb Emergent, among the last bastions of independent journalism in the country, were sealed in December 2022. By April 2023, the judiciary ordered their complete dissolution.
From 2020 to 2024, the number of prisoners of conscience has fluctuated between 150 and 350. Over 200 individuals, including journalists, lawyers, academics and activists, are behind bars simply for expressing their opinions and exercising their fundamental rights. Many are prosecuted under the notorious Article 87.
Tight regulations have made public demonstrations nearly impossible, even for those organized by registered political parties. Algeria, a country that prides itself on its steadfast support for the Palestinian people, has permitted just one nationwide protest, and even that was tightly controlled. The fear that such gatherings could evolve into anti-regime protests is palpable, revealing the delicate balance the authorities are trying to maintain between championing popular causes at the United Nations Security Council and suppressing dissent.
The Hirak movement’s rallying cry, “Civilian, not military rule,” contrasts with the trajectory of Tebboune’s presidency. Far from retreating, the military has only tightened its grip on Algeria’s political landscape since the ouster of Bouteflika, a move driven by public unrest but orchestrated by the military. At the time, Ahmed Gaid Salah, then the chief of staff, stepped into the power vacuum as the nation’s de facto leader, and the military dominance has only solidified under his successor, Said Chengriha.
The current administration has blurred the lines between the military and civilian leadership. Chengriha’s frequent appearances, from accompanying the president on official visits to his regular presence on national television, highlight just how deeply the military is embedded in power. The constitutional revision of November 2020 marked a turning point, officially granting the military the authority to protect the “state’s vital and strategic interests” under Article 30, further solidifying its political influence.
The so-called “New Algeria” has laid bare the military’s deepening control over state affairs. The High Security Council (HSC), where top military figures routinely meet with a select few civilians, has become a symbol of this hybrid power structure. In 2023 alone, the HSC met six times. Concurrently, a quiet yet intense purge within the military and intelligence services has unfolded, with dozens of officers either fleeing, imprisoned or forced into retirement since 2019, revealing internal power struggles and realignments. Gen. Ghali Belkecir, former head of the National Gendarmerie (national police) and in exile since summer 2019, stands as a prime example of this phenomenon.
In a controversial step further advancing military influence, Tebboune issued Decree 218 in June 2024, just ahead of the upcoming presidential election, permitting military officers to occupy senior roles within the civilian administration, a new and unexpected development. This decree allows “general officers and senior officers to occupy certain high-level positions within the state, particularly strategic and sensitive sectors related to sovereignty and vital national interests.” This is seen within the ruling authorities as a necessary measure for enhancing state efficiency and ensuring stability.
The likely re-election of the aging and ailing Tebboune appears to be a move to buy time to overhaul the security apparatus and cement power. The Hirak, which once rattled the state to its core, has left the ruling power struggling to reassert its authority. Now, as the regime attempts to rebuild after the disruption of the Hirak, it has chosen to centralize power around the military apparatus, with Tebboune’s endorsement.
Algeria’s fraught regional environment is critical in shaping the military’s growing apprehensions. As the largest country in Africa, Algeria must manage borders with six neighbors as well as the disputed Western Sahara; five are fragile states or regions embroiled in conflict.
The abrupt severance of diplomatic ties with Morocco in August 2021 has intensified an already frigid rivalry. Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel and its bolstered military cooperation have deeply unsettled Algeria’s military brass, sparking an unprecedented arms race. In response, Algeria’s defense budget ballooned to $21 billion in 2024, whereas the military budget averaged around $10 billion annually for nearly 20 years.
To the east, Libya’s ongoing instability remains a persistent security threat, with armed groups and a flow of weapons continually undermining border security. Meanwhile, Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whose relations with Algiers are deeply strained, continues to eye the Libyan capital of Tripoli. He could potentially gain control of the northern part of the Libyan-Algerian border, as groups loyal to him already control the southern section. This situation continues to raise concerns in Algeria, as reflected in an August statement from Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Algerian authorities are increasingly alarmed by the emergence of a new conflict zone along their border, where vital oil and gas facilities in In Amenas are located. This development adds further strain to a country already grappling with heightened security concerns across its borders.
Further south, the diplomatic fallout between Mali and Algeria and the recent collapse of the Algiers Peace Agreement in Mali have diminished Algeria’s once crucial role as a mediator, igniting fears of escalating violence along the Algeria-Mali border. In November 2023, Mali’s armed forces, with the backing of Russia’s Wagner Group, unleashed an aggressive offensive to reclaim the northern territories from separatist and autonomous factions. For years, these groups had held de facto control under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development, all while extremist threats simmered on the horizon. Now, nearly a year later, northern Mali has spiraled into a hotspot of relentless violence. Tens of thousands have poured into neighboring Algeria, as fierce battles between Mali’s army, bolstered by Wagner, and the rebels inch perilously close to the Algerian frontier.
The proximity of clashes in northern Mali, involving Wagner-backed rebels and Malian forces just a few miles away, is not only heightening tensions but also complicating Algeria’s relations with Russia because of Moscow’s growing role in the Sahel, creating instability in Algeria’s surroundings. Meanwhile, Niger’s fragile political situation following its July 2023 coup, exacerbated by extremist threats and illegal mining operations near the Algerian border, adds yet another layer of complexity to the country’s security landscape. These multifaceted southern threats have compelled the Algerian regime to maintain a state of heightened military readiness.
In parallel, several major diplomatic crises have marked Tebboune’s tenure. Relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Spain and France are all strained.
Algeria sees its relationship with the UAE as a growing source of tension, accusing the Emiratis of playing a disruptive role in the region. Unofficially, Algerian authorities criticize the UAE for pushing the normalization of ties with Israel across the region, investing in economic projects in the occupied Western Sahara territories and pursuing an aggressive influence campaign, starting with Sudan and Libya, and expanding to the Sahel in recent years.
The crisis with Spain began when the Spanish government recognized Morocco’s autonomy plan as a “credible, viable and sustainable” solution. Outraged by this decision, which it sees as violating international law, Algeria severed its treaty of friendship and cooperation with Spain in June 2022, severely affecting economic relations. However, Algeria has consistently upheld its commitments to oil and gas exports.
Most recently, Algeria recalled its ambassador from Paris in protest at President Emmanuel Macron’s endorsement of Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara. Algeria remains steadfast in its belief that the Sahrawi people are entitled to self-determination, a position supported by U.N. resolutions.
In stark contrast to its strained ties with France and Spain, Algeria has forged stronger relations with Italy, primarily driven by energy cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic allowed Algiers to geopolitically reposition itself as a key gas supplier to Europe, filling some gaps left by reduced Russian exports.
Algeria’s hydrocarbon revenue continues to bankroll social programs, from subsidies for necessities like food and electricity to newly introduced unemployment pensions and increased student stipends. While these measures are essential for vast segments of the population, they are often marred by corruption and inequality. For decades, the ruling authorities have leveraged oil wealth to maintain social peace and stave off political unrest despite a general decline in Algeria’s overall export volumes.
The hydrocarbon sector has undeniably fueled Algeria’s economic and human development, yet it remains a double-edged sword. According to the World Bank, it accounts for 19% of GDP, 93% of export revenue and 38% of budget income. This overreliance is increasingly unsustainable without genuine economic reforms. Despite some efforts to diversify the economy and boost employment through new laws, innovation strategies and public-private partnerships, progress has been painfully slow.
Unemployment stands officially at 12.25%, but among young Algerians, nearly 1 in 3 is jobless. As social despair continues, clandestine migration to Europe, known as “Harga,” persists, starkly illustrating political and socioeconomic failures. From 2020 to 2023, at least 42,000 Algerians reached European borders clandestinely, according to Frontex, the EU agency charged with coordinating the protection of Europe’s borders. Many travel on short-term visas, opting to stay indefinitely, while hundreds perish each year in the dangerous crossing.
Yet despite these crises, Algeria’s regime has demonstrated remarkable resilience. Even in the aftermath of the powerful Hirak movement, it has managed to buy time to regain its footing through a combination of repression, controlled elections, constitutional adjustments and increased social spending.
The new Algeria has cultivated a climate of fear and disillusionment, even for those who did not believe in the Hirak, as evidenced by the official low voter turnout in the 2021 parliamentary local elections. At the core of Algeria’s turmoil is a profound crisis of legitimacy. As the regime clings to power at all costs, the Algerian people are left to face a shrouded future. The question is whether this disenchantment cycle will persist or if a new movement can challenge the status quo. The world is watching.
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