Alleged classified documents belonging to Bashar al-Assad’s regime and uncovered after its fall offer a glimpse into a covert “mechanism” managed by Russia to limit Israeli military intervention in Syria. At issue was Assad’s increased reliance on Iran and its proxies, such as Hezbollah, to maintain his hold on power after a decade of crippling civil war.
The newly surfaced papers, marked “top secret and urgent,” reveal a mixture of threats and after-action memos detailing what Israel had just destroyed in 2023 and why. They offer the first real glimpse of what had long been suspected but never proven: that Israel, content to leave a weakened Assad in place and allow the Syrian Arab Army to meet its security “needs,” was dead set against the flow of Iranian weapons and the strengthening of militants loyal to Tehran in Syria, especially in the Golan Heights.
An Israeli operative code-named “Mousa” (Moses in English) directly messaged former Syrian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Ali Mahmoud Abbas, the documents show. Abbas, who had served as the defense minister from April 28, 2022, then forwarded the communiques on to Ali Mamlouk, Assad’s notorious intelligence chief.
The series of documents examined by New Lines, based on screenshots circulating on social media, is dated from May to July 2023 — just a few months prior to Hamas’ atrocities against civilians in Israel on Oct. 7, followed by Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Oct. 8. Israel’s long and punishing response to both has resulted in the annihilation of Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s senior military and political leaderships and arguably ended a project of Iranian hegemony in Levant that has lasted decades. It also indirectly contributed to Assad’s swift and unexpected ouster from power at the hands of Islamist rebels enabled by Turkey. That in turn led to Israel’s immediate intervention, denying those Islamists the very strategic weapons Israel had spared when they were under Assad’s control.
While we have not been able to independently verify the authenticity of the documents, several factors lead us to believe they are genuine. First, the cache surfaced immediately after the collapse of Assad’s regime, originating from intelligence sites in Damascus. Second, the documents bear official Syrian government stamps and formatting, including identifiers specific to the intelligence and defense sectors. Lastly, the information contained within these documents aligns with publicly available details and news reports about specific events, targets and operational timelines.
“The details of this unique covert deconfliction mechanism with Russia show clearly the overall Israeli comfort with Assad’s regime, emphasizing the old adage ‘the devil you know,’” Marc Polymeropolous, a former CIA officer with extensive experience in the Middle East, told New Lines. “This comfort also may have contributed negatively, however, to Israel’s initial reluctance to assist Ukraine, given Israel’s reliance on Russia in Syria.”
For instance, one message from May 17, 2023, underscores Israel’s anger over Iranian provocations: “On April 8, 2023, they launched three rockets toward Israel from the Golan Heights under the instruction of Hamas. Lately, because of the Quds Day and Flag March, we are observing Palestinian activities on your land. If the person leading these is not clear to you, these elements are directed by Khaled Meshaal and Saleh al-Arouri of Hamas. We warn you of the prospect of any activity of these parties on your territory and we demand you stop any [Iranian] preparations for the use of these forces on your territory — you’re responsible for what is happening in Syria.”
Moses goes on to allude to an unspecified Israeli “warning shot” in response to the rocket fire, presumably referring to the Israeli military’s artillery and drone strikes in southern Syria to take out the rocket launchers.
“Our next attack will be significantly stronger and more severe than what we’ve done so far,” Moses warns. “You will pay an unprecedented, hefty price.” Weeks later, on May 29, 2023, the operative cites explicit targets Israel had struck, such as “weapons depots linked to the southern command in Damascus” and a “training camp in Dumayr” used by Hezbollah. Syrian state-run news agency SANA reported on the strikes on May 29, saying Israel conducted strikes in and around Damascus from the Golan Heights the night before.
The documents reveal a deep reliance on Russian oversight, with Moscow playing an active role in moderating tensions between the two sides. Israel avoided targeting key Syrian military sites as long as Damascus adhered to the rules of the game. In return, Russia maintained its leverage over both parties, ensuring Assad’s regime survived.
The mechanism’s primary aim was ostensibly to limit Iran and Hezbollah’s operations, especially the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon. For example, a message from June 8, 2023, details Israeli intelligence tracking Iranian shipments: “Over the last two weeks, we observed the landing of eight planes in Hmeimim air base arriving from Iran. … Weapons were transferred on these planes. … If you continue to allow the transfer of weapons for Hezbollah and Iran, we will not stand idly by.”
These messages illustrate the precision of Israeli intelligence, which tracked shipments from their arrival at Russian-controlled air bases to their final destinations in Latakia and Qutayfa. Moses often warned Syria of specific individuals involved, such as Hezbollah commander Hajj Hashem (Munir Ali Naim Shaito) and operations like the “Golan File” training camps near Damascus. In every instance, the warnings carried an implicit — and sometimes explicit — threat of military retaliation.
The “Golan File” is a covert Hezbollah operation aimed at establishing Iranian and Hezbollah infrastructure and networks along the Syrian-Israeli border in the Golan Heights. Directed at the time by senior Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq, also known as Abu Hussein Sajid, the project has sought to create cells capable of launching attacks into Israeli territory. Daqduq, who previously orchestrated attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, was reportedly killed in an Israeli strike on Nov. 10 this year.
The strategy includes recruiting local operatives and stockpiling weapons to support potential attacks. These activities were part of Hezbollah’s broader goal of leveraging the conflict in Syria to establish a new front against Israel. The initiative reportedly received direction from top Hezbollah and Iranian officials, including Hassan Nasrallah and Quds Force leadership.
In response to these threats, Israel conducted numerous preemptive operations to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the region. For instance, a December 2023 airstrike in southern Syria targeted and killed Muhammad al-Tamar, also known as Abu Julan, a key operative within the Golan File unit. This operation highlights Israel’s ongoing efforts to counteract the growing Hezbollah presence near its borders.
The following is a transcript of one of the regime’s memos containing messages sent by “Moses”:
Syrian Arab Republic
General Command of the Army and Armed Forces
Intelligence Division – Office of the Division Head
Number: /2450/1
Date: 29/5/2023
To: The Head of the National Security Office
Following our letter No. /2254/1 dated 17/5/2023 regarding the message from the Israeli (Moses)
On 29/5/2023, a message was received via WhatsApp by the Office of the Minister of Defense from the individual known as (Moses), containing the following (verbatim):
“Greetings, Sir… This is Moses.
Earlier, we targeted storage facilities belonging to the southern command in Damascus.
In addition, we struck a training camp in Dumair used by the Golan File, led by Abu Hussain Sajid, for conducting training and building forces to enhance their capabilities for actions against my country.
We emphasize that we will not accept the presence of Hajj Hashem and his personnel in southern Syria.
Cooperation with Hezbollah harms the Syrian military and its personnel, and you are paying the price.
Any support you provide to the (Iranian) axis and Hezbollah in a manner that harms my country will be met with a severe response.
Best regards.”
Please review,
Head of the Intelligence Division.
In another message sent on June 16, 2023, Moses says:
We noticed that starting from July 6-7, Ilyushin 76 aircraft from the 29th Brigade of the Syrian Air Force were no longer landing at Hmeimim Airport.
As we have explained to you multiple times before, these planes were also used to transfer weapons for the Quds Force and Hezbollah, facilitated by Syrian security officials from Latakia.
We want to emphasize that stopping the flights of these planes (by your side), in addition to halting the Iranian cargo flights of Caspian Airlines and Fars Air Qeshm, which were landing at Nayrab Airport, are regarded (by us) as positive steps that will safeguard your interests.
We do not wish to take action against the Syrian Arab Army. Therefore, using the organized mechanism under Russian supervision will allow you to meet the army’s needs without risking infrastructure or sites exploited by the Iranians for weapons transfers, which ultimately cause harm to you.
Since you are the party responsible for halting these flights, know that you have successfully prevented an unnecessary confrontation, one that neither side desires.
Despite all these matters, know that we are closely monitoring and will continue to closely monitor the ongoing activity in the area. Accordingly, if we observe the resumption of weapons transfers aimed at strengthening Hezbollah and the Iranians, we will have no choice but to take action again with great intensity. The outcome depends on you. Stay well.
The tone of the message seems to be intended to boast about the depth of penetration and surveillance inside Syria’s defense infrastructure, trolling the regime’s defense minister. Because the sender claims to be Israeli, it is likely that the defense minister made sure to forward the messages “verbatim” to avoid any accusations of unreported contacts with the Israelis.
The Moses documents bring into sharper focus the dynamics between Assad and Iran. For years, Israel’s accusations portrayed Assad as a willing facilitator of Iran’s military buildup and covert operations in Syria. But the reality appears more complicated. Assad may have tried to limit Iran’s activities where possible, but Iran likely operated independently of Damascus, maintaining a firewall to ensure secrecy and prevent infiltration.
Iran’s strategy created significant challenges for Assad. While the Syrian regime bore the brunt of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets, it often lacked visibility into the full extent of Tehran’s operations. For Iran, this separation insulated its activities from Syrian interference and reduced the risk of Israeli intelligence gaining insights through Syrian leaks or spies. As the documents reveal, Israel’s precision strikes, informed by detailed intelligence, often disrupted Syrian infrastructure and military assets, even when Assad had no direct involvement in the Iranian activities that provoked them.
This dynamic left Assad in a precarious position. The fallout from Iranian operations made it harder for his regime to rebuild and weakened its standing with regional neighbors like Turkey and the Arab Gulf states, with whom Assad was attempting to normalize or deepen relations. At the same time, Assad’s efforts to maintain calm on the Golan Heights and stay out of broader regional conflicts, such as the war in Gaza, signaled a desire to distance himself from Tehran’s more aggressive strategies as he emerged a “victor” in the 13-year civil war.
Assad’s silence during the Gaza war was out of sync with the broader Iranian strategy. While Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis escalated their involvement, Damascus conspicuously avoided confrontation with Israel. This strategy aligned with Assad’s goals of presenting himself as a stabilizing force, avoiding direct Israeli retaliation and building goodwill among neighboring countries.
The documents show how Israeli warnings, like those sent by Moses, emphasized the costs of tolerating Iranian activities. For example, a July 14, 2023, message stated: “As long as you continue to provide support to the Iranians on the level of weapon transfers, we will have to return to operating against such activities. You ignored warnings and now your infrastructure pays the price.”
At the same time, Assad’s efforts to distance himself from Iran during the Gaza war became evident through actions like expelling the Houthis from the Yemeni embassy and refraining from endorsing Hezbollah’s rhetoric. These moves were likely calculated to align Syria with its Gulf neighbors, who are increasingly interested in a pragmatic relationship with Damascus as part of their broader regional strategies.
One Israeli expert who asked not to be identified for this story told New Lines that it made sense for Israel to relay detailed information about Iran’s weapons transfers to the Assad regime, not only to telegraph the depth and scope of its penetration in Syria but to emphasize the seeming autonomy and independence of the Syrian “mukhabarat” (intelligence agencies). Doing so, the expert said, would help widen the gap between Tehran and Damascus.
This Moses back channel unraveled with the collapse of Assad’s regime on Dec. 8. Hours later, Israel mounted an invasion of the Syrian province of Quneitra, ostensibly responding to attacks by anti-Assad rebels on a U.N. observer post. This was the opening phase of “Operation Bashan Arrow,” an unprecedented campaign in which Israel’s air force and navy conducted 350 strikes against the very Syrian military infrastructure it previously spared under the deconfliction mechanism with Damascus. The Israeli military reportedly took out between 70% and 80% of Syria’s strategic defenses, including much of its chemical weapons program. Syria’s own air force and navy all but disappeared. These strikes marked a departure from the calibrated approach Israel maintained under the mechanism, underscoring the absence of Russian oversight and the loss of a partner to uphold agreements.
According to David McCloskey, a former CIA officer and author of the spy thrillers “Damascus Station” and “The Seventh Floor,” “The documents offer an astounding glimpse into the extent to which Syria’s weakened, hollowed regime had become a regional plaything. They also show the failure of Assad’s long-standing instinct to play all sides — Iran, Russia, Israel, its Arab neighbors — against the other, [and] the weakness of such an approach when, by the end, he held no cards.”