The violence in Sweida this month exposed the fragility of Syria’s post-Assad order, in which outside interference and failure to broaden political representation threaten the national euphoria that followed the collapse of the regime seven months ago.
It began with a roadside assault on July 11. A Druze vegetable seller was beaten and robbed by armed Bedouins along the Damascus-Sweida highway. Coming after a series of tense incidents between the two communities in the province and on the outskirts of Damascus, the attack was enough to trigger a cycle of kidnappings and retaliations. Within 48 hours, local feuds escalated into firefights. By the end of the week, government forces had entered the city, and Israeli jets were in the air.
Sweida, once a symbol of relative calm in southern Syria, became a microcosm of the broader fractures threatening the country’s future. Israel’s decision to intervene, framing its strikes as “protection” of the Druze, deepened old fault lines. The Israeli intervention ignited a surge of anti-Druze sentiment across the country, while the Syrian government’s entry into the city reinforced the long-standing fears of religious and ethnic minorities.
The Sweida crisis has played out on three levels: the hyperlocal arena of real grievances and real atrocities, committed by both Druze and Bedouins; the national situation, whereby a weakened state is still unable to unify its peripheries or project a coherent nationalist narrative; and the foreign interventions that have seen a volatile conflict hijacked by external actors and amplified through online disinformation.
Inside Syria, each side has its version of events, and each version has its facts. Outside it, as in the case of Israel, the crisis was quickly overtaken by voices interested, not in justice or reconciliation for Syrians, but in narratives designed to exacerbate existing divisions and fracture the country. These narratives played out in one of the most aggressive disinformation campaigns across social media and policy platforms in Syria’s recent history, creating mass confusion as to what, exactly, just happened in the country.
The reality is simpler, if no less dangerous, than the false narratives being spun. The crisis was fueled, first and foremost, by Israel’s military and political calculations and, second, by Syria’s persistent failure to secure political settlements in at least four of its 10 provinces, territories currently controlled by Druze and Kurdish factions. That failure is shared by both Damascus and the local authorities, who have so far been unable or unwilling to reconcile their competing visions for Syria’s future. In the case of Sweida, however, progress toward a settlement has been obstructed in large part by Israel, which has lobbied the Trump administration to keep Syria weak and continues to view any reassertion of Syrian sovereignty near its borders as a potential threat.
Getting the diagnosis right matters. It is the difference between helping Syria move toward a steady and stable transition, where all Syrians have a stake in a peaceful and prosperous future, and pushing the country toward a fractious, unstable future and once again turning it into a proxy battleground, including, ironically, for the Islamic Republic, Israel’s arch nemesis.
A close look at how the latest cycle of violence quickly escalated serves as a warning of what can go wrong on a larger scale, especially when Israel moves swiftly to pour more gasoline on the fire. The Sweida situation exploded following the July 11 incident along the Damascus-Sweida highway. The Bedouins’ attack on the Druze vegetable merchant’s truck — in which the driver, reportedly a man named Fadlallah Duwara, was assaulted and his vehicle stolen — was more highway robbery than sectarian venom. Many parts of Syria remain unguarded and prone to such crimes of opportunity. Nonetheless, Druze locals in Sweida quickly retaliated against the Bedouin tribes, and a wave of tit-for-tat kidnappings ensued between the two communities.
This cycle of abductions stirred long-standing animosities. By the night of July 11 and into the morning of July 12, each side was holding captives from the other, setting the stage for broader violence. Prior tensions in the suburbs and on the outskirts of Damascus — such as in Sahnaya, a town with a significant Druze population where local communities clashed with armed tribal militias from eastern Syria — had been contained, but they left behind sectarian fault lines that helped shape the escalation.
Saturday, July 12, marked the first armed clashes in Sweida province, as the kidnappings escalated into open combat. Local Druze factions, both those aligned with and opposed to spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, mobilized to confront armed Bedouin groups in what began as localized firefights. In Sweida, “Bedouin” is often used broadly to describe rural or tribal communities, commonly referred to as “ashayer,” or tribes, which are historically concentrated in two neighborhoods inside the city and in about eight villages outside it. It’s worth noting that the Druze themselves are a tribal society, one that centers honor and hospitality alongside a distinct religious identity. By that night and into the next day, the violence had spread.
By Sunday, July 13, heavy fighting engulfed parts of the city of Sweida and its outskirts. In the city’s eastern, Bedouin-majority Maqwas neighborhood, fierce battles broke out between armed Druze locals and Bedouin tribal fighters, escalating the first major outbreak of deadly violence in the province in years. Members of Bedouin tribes launched attacks on Druze villages on Sweida’s western and northern edges, trading fire with local militias and driving residents to seek shelter.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported the next day that 99 people had been killed since fighting erupted, including around 60 Druze, with a few civilians among them, 18 Bedouin fighters, 14 government security personnel and several unidentified combatants. Dozens more were injured, overwhelming local hospitals. The Syrian Interior Ministry acknowledged “bloody developments” and at least 30 deaths in the communal clashes.
What began as a local feud had now become a full-scale sectarian confrontation in and around Sweida, threatening to spill into other parts of the country. The sectarian and tribal fervor was fueled by violations from both sides, including anti-Druze slogans and footage of pro-government forces shaving the mustaches of Druze elders, which are a sign of dignity and honor in Druze society.
On Monday, July 14, the conflict took another turn. Syria’s interim government, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, moved to contain the spiraling violence. The Interior Ministry announced that, in coordination with the Defense Ministry, it was deploying units of the Syrian Armed Forces and Internal Security forces to Sweida to “stop the clashes [and] impose security.” A curfew was declared as columns of government troops with tanks entered the province. By Monday afternoon, Syrian army units had taken control of at least one Druze village, al-Mazraa, on the outskirts and were heading toward Sweida city. The government portrayed the operation as peacekeeping, vowing to prosecute those responsible for the unrest.
Both the government and the Druze agree that the move was coordinated between them, but they disagree on who gave the permission. According to the government, it had permission from all local Druze factions for its security forces to enter the city. But the main Druze faction in Sweida, loyal to the Israel-backed al-Hajari, accused one Druze leader, Laith al-Balous, of coordinating with the Syrian government to enter the city without the consensus of his fellow Druze activists.
Al-Balous presented a different version of events. Ahead of the military’s arrival in Sweida, according to this version, Syrian officials quietly informed top Druze religious and community leaders of a plan to deploy limited forces to contain tensions with local Arab tribes. However, no public clarification was made, and residents, unaware of the troops’ identity, mistook them for hostile militias. The resulting confusion triggered violent clashes. The statement by al-Balous described the bloodshed as a preventable tragedy caused by poor communication.
The government, in turn, said the “ambush” of security forces led the authorities to take over the city within three hours after they were attacked. Druze fighters loyal to al-Hajari saw that as a violation of existing agreements to keep Sweida under local control. The Druze also feared that the government forces were effectively siding with the Bedouin tribes, as sectarian slogans hit fever pitch. Whatever the truth, the arrival of government forces added another layer to the conflict. Clashes erupted between the army and local Druze militias, which viewed the deployment with suspicion.
At this stage, on July 15, blame could be distributed evenly between the Israel-backed al-Hajari and the Syrian government. For seven months after the fall of the Assad regime, al-Hajari resisted efforts to negotiate a peaceful deal that would allow Damascus to reestablish control in Sweida. Even some of his closest Druze allies during the current fighting have previously criticized him for his “stubbornness” and failure to articulate clear terms for a political settlement, instead defaulting to a knee-jerk rejection of the entry of government forces, a position that aligned with Israel’s own insistence not to stand down and allow Damascus-backed troops into the Syrian city. According to Ahmad al-Dalati, the Syrian government official overseeing security in Sweida, Damascus went as far as integrating 240 former Assad-era security personnel — who are Druze — into the new state structure in its attempt to gain al-Hajari’s support and address criticism that its rank and file, primarily Sunni Arabs, did not reflect the diversity of the region. Former Assad regime officers were involved in the July clashes, including Hadi Abu Asi, who was later eulogized by Israel-backed Druze fighters as a martyr.
The Syrian government shares the blame because of a miscalculation on its part. In all likelihood, Damascus believed it had an opportunity to retake Sweida by force after sensing American support for its control of the whole country, which included public remarks by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and pressure on the Kurds in eastern Syria to integrate the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian government. The “forced entry” into Sweida came shortly after a heated meeting between the SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and officials in Damascus. According to Syrians privy to the meeting, the emboldened al-Sharaa team demanded the Kurds promptly hand over their area of Deir ez-Zor to the Syrian government, followed by other steps to integrate into state institutions.
But it was overconfidence that proved costly for al‑Sharaa. Reuters reports that he believed he had a tacit green light from both the United States and Israel to deploy government forces into Sweida, interpreting Barrack’s push for a unified Syria and security talks with Israel in Baku, which the U.S. envoy had been leading, as a license to move in without risking pushback from Israel. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also called the situation a “misunderstanding” between Israel and Damascus.
The balance of blame tilted toward al-Hajari after he called for Israeli intervention against his own country, further inflaming an already volatile situation. In response, the Israeli air force struck Syrian military assets advancing toward Sweida. Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that the strikes had targeted “several tanks” and other vehicles, a move he described as “a clear warning to the Syrian regime” to prevent “harm to the Druze in Syria.” These airstrikes, the first of several that week, were framed as a “deterrent” against Damascus, part of Israel’s self-declared (and inflammatory) policy to shield the Druze community in Syria. Al-Hajari’s appeal to Israel, paired with al-Sharaa’s misreading of American and Israeli positions, helped turn a local feud that would have been resolved as similar feuds in the region’s history have been — through negotiations between tribal elders — into a regional flash point.
Recognizing the danger, top Druze leaders in both Lebanon and Syria, including Walid Jumblatt, Sheikh Sami Abi Al-Muna and al-Balous placed blame on al-Hajari for the crisis.
The entry of government troops, followed by Israeli warnings and airstrikes, threatened to expand the conflict beyond Sweida. At the same time, a vicious online campaign distorted the nature of the violence, casting it as a jihadist invasion and recycling graphic footage from past wars, especially Islamic State group atrocities and the ongoing conflict in Gaza. While it is highly likely that gruesome human rights abuses will come to light via international monitors, a lot of unverified Islamic State-era accusations were circulated on social media, including claims of sex slavery, mass rape and the distribution of morning-after pills. Syria’s Minister of Information has revealed that around 300,000 active social media accounts are spreading disinformation on X, primarily from four countries, with some posing as pro-government voices while promoting divisive narratives, and warned that up to 10,000 fake accounts are being created each day.
Such inflammatory language online appears to have been designed to precipitate an emotional response from outside parties in an effort to influence U.S. policymaking. Indeed, pro-Israel commentators in the West, including those affiliated with influential Washington-based think tanks, moved swiftly to outline with a broad brush how Israel was “protecting minorities” in Syria and therefore “engaging in a humanitarian intervention.” Never mind that these same people routinely exonerate Israel of genocide and war crimes, many of which were being registered just as the Sweida operation got underway, and conveniently look past how the Druze who live in Israel and dutifully serve in its military remain second-class citizens, as one New Lines essay explains. The events in Sweida were recast not as what they were, a tribal feud that required containment by Syrians familiar with actors’ sensibilities, but as a religious war — with framing reminiscent of the West’s “war on terror.”
At least in the early days, Bedouin families inside Sweida city became particularly vulnerable. The Israel-backed Druze forces turned on local Bedouins and ambushed the incoming government troops, triggering a mass flight of Bedouin civilians from the city. Their displacement — and the subsequent social media images and unverified panic of Bedouin women and children stranded in the desert and subject to Druze violence — in turn set off cries for help and mobilized tribal networks from across the country. Hundreds of civilians and fighters were reportedly taken captive by armed Druze during and after the clashes.
The Bedouin side also engaged in atrocities. Bedouin tribal fighters had been implicated in sectarian-motivated attacks on Druze civilians in the early stages. For example, between July 13 and 14, armed Bedouin men were reported to have shot dead Druze villagers and even executed some prisoners during the chaos. The conflict took on a revenge-driven character, with both communities engaged in violent one-upmanship.
Bedouin tribes from across Syria began mobilizing en masse to aid their brethren. Up to 50,000 from some 40 clans were reportedly called up and started converging on Sweida, according to local monitors, an unprecedented event even at the height of the Syrian conflict after 2011. Dozens of armed clans, from as far away as Hama and Aleppo provinces, sent fighters or declared their intent to join the battle. The tribal reinforcements gathered on Sweida’s peripheries; an AFP correspondent observed about 200 tribal fighters massing at the western entrance of Sweida city on July 17 and 18.
On July 16, Human Rights Watch noted “serious abuses” by both sides and that sectarian abuse, looting and home burnings were widespread. Syrian government forces had already been accused of such acts against Druze civilians during their brief deployment. Residents and monitors reported that Syrian security forces, during their sweep into the city, had committed violations against civilians, including reports of summary executions of noncombatants.
According to an Axios report on July 16, a senior U.S. official stated that American intelligence did not find evidence implicating the Syrian government in atrocities committed in Sweida. Meanwhile, Israeli officials reportedly described the violence as akin to an “October 7-style attack” on the Druze community, framing it as a national trauma. The same U.S. official noted that Israel’s military response was shaped as much by domestic pressure from its own Druze population as by developments on the ground in Syria.
In reality, a few unknowns are yet to be uncovered, including the role of both former Assad officers and the Islamic State on both sides of the conflict. Islamic State members from nearby strongholds in the Syrian desert made their way into Sweida, according to both al-Dalati and Barrack. This only contributed to the narrative that al-Sharaa was still a jihadist at his core and responsible for the sectarian atrocities. Sooner or later, al-Sharaa will need to confront extremists in his midst who, for political reasons, he has largely tolerated thus far.
There is also evidence of the involvement of former Assad officers with links to both Iran and the drug trade in the country, who have an obvious vested interest in chaos and division to undermine and destabilize the government in Damascus. Ironically, this goal is shared by Israel, which prefers to see Syria fragmented and divided rather than a strong central state in control of all its provinces, as Barrack told The Associated Press. “Strong nation-states are a threat — especially Arab states are viewed as a threat to Israel,” he said.
Still, around midday on July 15, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra announced a “complete ceasefire” in Sweida after reaching an “agreement with the city’s notables and dignitaries.” He ordered all units in Sweida to halt fire and said the army would respond only to anyone who shot at them. Druze community representatives had been negotiating with the authorities to defuse the crisis. By early afternoon, gunfire largely subsided in parts of Sweida city following this truce declaration, and government troops momentarily paused offensive operations.
International reactions intensified. As the partial ceasefire took effect, Israel launched new strikes on July 15, targeting Syrian regime forces in Sweida province for a second straight day. Israeli officials stated these strikes were in direct response to Syria’s actions in Sweida and were intended to enforce a Druze “safe zone” near the Israeli border. In addition, dozens of Israeli Druze citizens from the Golan Heights crossed the border into Syria in a show of solidarity and were briefly on Syrian soil on the 15th before being escorted back by the Israeli military.
A critical turning point occurred on Wednesday, July 16, marked by international intervention and a shift in ground control. Early that day, Israel significantly escalated its involvement by bombing targets in Damascus, including heavy airstrikes near the Syrian Ministry of Defense headquarters and the presidential palace. It was Israel’s third consecutive day of attacks during the Sweida crisis, with one strike partially destroying the Defense Ministry building. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later stated that the July 16 strikes, which also targeted Syrian military convoys in Sweida, aimed to “defend the Druze and enforce a demilitarized zone” in southern Syria. Even as Israel frequently struck the Assad regime in recent years, it never struck any major government institution inside the city of Damascus.
Under U.S. auspices, with support from Turkey and Jordan, al-Sharaa’s administration agreed to withdraw the Syrian army and heavy forces from Sweida in exchange for a halt to fighting. Indeed, by the evening of July 16, all Syrian Defense Ministry troops pulled out of Sweida city, handing back control to local authorities and effectively restoring the province’s de facto autonomy under Druze community leadership.
Government forces, now constrained by the ceasefire with Druze fighters and barred from reentering Sweida under the U.S.-Israeli agreement, largely stood aside. SOHR claimed that Syrian authorities facilitated the transit of tribal fighters into the province since the army itself was not allowed to deploy under the Israel-brokered terms. This perceived green light to the tribes raised fears that the government was tacitly encouraging a proxy revenge campaign against the Druze. Al-Sharaa, in a speech on July 19, praised the “nationwide mobilization of Bedouin fighters toward Sweida” and labeled the Israel-backed Druze militias as “outlaw groups.” For critics, this seemed to endorse the tribal campaign rather than restrain it.
For civilians in Sweida, on July 17, widespread panic and a mass exodus to Daraa were sparked by scenes of an impending Bedouin counterattack. Thousands of Druze families abandoned Sweida city and its surrounding villages, contributing to a cumulative displacement of nearly 80,000, with the International Organization for Migration recording 20,000 fleeing on July 17 alone. Roads became gridlocked with cars and trucks carrying Druze residents seeking safety in other areas or nearby Daraa province. Concurrently, many Bedouin civilians also sought to escape Sweida, fearing retaliatory actions.
In the early hours of Saturday, July 19, Barrack announced that a new truce had been brokered. Al-Sharaa and Netanyahu had agreed to a ceasefire, with Turkey and Jordan also endorsing it. Barrack posted on social media that the parties had “navigated to a pause and cessation of hostilities” and that the next step would be a comprehensive exchange of detainees and hostages between the sides. Hundreds of captives were held by each camp at this point — Druze militias held scores of Bedouin civilians and fighters, while Bedouin groups had abducted Druze individuals during the chaos. This U.S.-backed ceasefire plan was effectively an expanded version of the July 16 truce, now explicitly involving Israel and regional powers as guarantors.
By Sunday, July 20, a fragile calm had returned to Sweida. Residents reported that active combat had ceased. That day, Syria’s Interior Ministry announced that all Bedouin tribal fighters had fully withdrawn from Sweida city. Reuters images showed Syrian internal security troops blocking roads outside Sweida, preventing any lingering armed groups from reentering. The ceasefire was holding, though the situation remained uneasy. Barrack confirmed that both sides were observing a “pause and cessation of hostilities,” and he pushed for organizing a complete exchange of prisoners and hostages between the Druze and Bedouin sides. Reports indicated hundreds of Bedouin captives and a number of Druze captives needed to be swapped.
Though immediate bloodshed ceased, tensions remained high. All parties traded blame for the atrocities. The government vowed to investigate and prosecute any abuses “regardless of rank,” even arresting one soldier on July 16 for his conduct. Many in the Druze community felt deep mistrust toward Damascus, given the army’s violence against Druze civilians during the intervention. Conversely, Bedouin leaders distrusted the ceasefire, given that their fighters had been compelled to withdraw without a clear guarantee of their community’s safety. The conflict, while temporarily halted, exposed sectarian fault lines in postwar Syria and seriously challenged the al-Sharaa government’s authority and promises to protect minorities.
Sweida is quiet but on edge. Internal security forces and local Druze fighters jointly patrol a tense peace. The hostage exchanges are in progress but not fully resolved, with each side still holding captives from the other. Aid is slowly reaching the population, and efforts to rebuild infrastructure have begun.
Al-Sharaa has faced two major crises — in the coastal region with the Alawite communities, and in Sweida with the Druze — both of which have raised questions about his leadership. With continued unrest in Sweida and the U.S. Congress’ move this week to condition the lifting of sanctions on protecting minorities and countering the Captagon trade, he is under growing pressure. Despite this, he has taken a significant political risk by engaging with Israeli officials, reportedly offering incentives to reduce tensions, including access to the file on executed Israeli spy Eli Cohen. His foreign minister has welcomed Jewish business leaders from New York, and members of the Syrian Jewish diaspora have begun visiting the country. These moves suggest an intent to improve relations with Israel, a stance that has drawn criticism from hard-liners who supported his rise to power.
Israel’s recent strikes on the Syrian Defense Ministry and presidential palace raise questions about its strategic objectives. There is concern about the implications of further instability. If al-Sharaa is removed, it is unclear who would succeed him or what internal forces could emerge in his absence. If the stated concern is Syria’s inability to contain extremist elements, targeting the government institutions most capable of exerting control appears counterintuitive. The issue of sovereignty is also at play, as the strikes suggest a willingness to dictate the limits of another state’s internal governance.
This approach may have unintended consequences. In Sweida, long-term beneficiaries of the instability could include Iran. A former U.S. official told New Lines that the majority of Syria’s Captagon trade now flows through Sweida, a network largely managed by figures close to Israel-backed al-Hajari. Jordanian authorities have confirmed Sweida’s role as a central hub for drug smuggling out of Syria.
The crisis in Sweida is no longer just a local or even national story. Israel’s intervention and the disinformation campaign that followed reframed what began as a tribal and political dispute into something far more distorted, and fueled sectarian warfare and division that served foreign policy agendas rather than addressed legitimate Syrian grievances. This has not only weakened the al-Sharaa government’s ability to respond but has emboldened other actors across Syria. In the northeast, Kurdish leaders now see an opening to press maximalist demands for autonomy, confident that any firm response from Damascus risks triggering Israeli airstrikes or fresh sanctions from Washington.
Each attempt by Damascus to reassert national authority risks inviting external punishment, while restraint invites fragmentation. In this landscape, the greatest casualty may not be territory, but the idea of Syria as a sovereign state capable of resolving its own disputes, and Syrians’ dream of a stable and prosperous future.
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