“We were old foes. … Today we are allies. I was one of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s fiercest opponents during my time as director of moral guidance in the Syrian National Army (SNA). We fought battles against [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham]. But to be fair, Jolani invited me for talks in 2021 and we continued the discussion until we laid out a plan to merge some factions in preparation for the ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ operation. Today, I believe in Ahmad al-Sharaa’s ability to unify the factions and build Syria’s army.”
These were the words of Hasan Dugheim, a former SNA commander turned revolutionary, spoken to me just one day before the “victory speech” delivered by al-Sharaa on Jan. 29. During the speech, given in front of key armed factions and their commanders and aired by both regional and international media outlets, al-Sharaa announced the formal integration of the factions into the Ministry of Defense, including former and current SNA battalions. He also dissolved all political parties connected to the regime of the toppled President Bashar al-Assad and declared himself president of the country’s ongoing transitional phase, a move of which Syrians appear largely supportive — if cautiously so.
Of all the challenges currently facing postwar Syria, which is in dire need of something like a Marshall Plan, the integration of the country’s numerous and diverse armed factions into a single, disciplined postrevolutionary national army is among the greatest. Al-Sharaa, who dropped his former nom de guerre of Jolani, has so far succeeded in dissolving the Turkish-backed factions in the northern parts of Syria and turning many of his former adversaries into allies. But he has not yet been able to cajole two of the country’s most powerful factions into the fold of a unified and disciplined national army. The southern parts of Syria remain under the influence of Ahmad al-Ouda’s factions, backed by Russia and the United Arab Emirates, while the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, supported by the United States, continues to hold its ground in the northeast. Without these two, it is unlikely that al-Sharaa can form a cohesive national army, and the country risks fracturing back into armed conflict.
There are also major issues with the integration of the factions already merged under the Ministry of Defense, namely the top-down approach so far favored by al-Sharaa, which gives priority based on loyalty rather than on merit, and fails to mitigate the ideological and class-based differences between — and within — the factions now under his command. This, in addition to geopolitical dynamics — like Turkey’s ambiguous role, Israel’s ongoing strikes and land grab inside Syria, and its violation of a 1974 “disengagement agreement” between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights — add further complexity to an already precarious transition.
During my fieldwork over the last three years in northern Syria and southern Turkey, I had the opportunity to sit down with fighters, commanders and military officials from various factions within the SNA. Over countless hours of interviews — more than 100 in total — I listened to their stories, gaining a deeper understanding of what drives them to join and remain within armed groups.
As a Syrian academic, my background allowed me to connect with these individuals on a more personal level. Many opened up about the complex mix of loyalty, pragmatism and survival that shapes their choices, often rooted in historical grievances and shifting alliances. Their perspectives offered a rare glimpse into the emotional and psychological factors that influence both their decisions and their sense of identity.
This research, supported by the XCEPT (Cross-Border, Conflict, Evidence, Policy, Trends) program, gave me a front-row seat to the challenges of integrating diverse factions into a unified military force. Through these conversations, I saw firsthand how fighters navigate the uncertainties of Syria’s post-Assad landscape, revealing not only their struggles but also their hopes for the future.
In January, I also finally returned to Damascus after 14 years of absence. I found that the streets bore scars of a fallen regime, and the symbols of the former ruling Baath Party that once dominated the city lay in ruins. Beyond the capital, the country continues to reel from the destruction and divisiveness it endured after the uprising that began in March 2011 descended into war.
During my visit, I found many officials at the Ministry of Defense who echoed Dugheim’s optimism. But some expressed to me their concern over the deep-seated distrust and fear among the rank and file of the newly formed armed forces. One central SNA commander captured this sentiment. “My rifle is my only guarantee of safety, and its price has been paid in blood. I’ll join the Ministry of Defense, but I will never give up my weapon. After 14 years of revolution, I won’t accept being sidelined or thrown into prison,” he told me in confidence, reflecting the precarious nature of Syria’s transitional phase.
Over the last 14 years, Syria’s military landscape has been shaped by a complex array of armed factions. The SNA, for example, which includes three corps and the National Liberation Front (estimated at 40,000 fighters), operated in Turkish-backed areas near the Turkish border in northern Syria. The U.S.-backed SDF, positioned in the northeast, has approximately 70,000 militants. The southern factions led by al-Ouda had ties with Russia and had reached so-called “reconciliation” agreements with Assad before the regime’s fall, and they have not yet joined the new Ministry of Defense, citing concerns over representation and political guarantees. Finally, there are the factions based in Sweida, southeast of Damascus, who also continue to resist integration, demanding greater political autonomy and assurances regarding their role in the new military structure.
To understand what may lie ahead, one can look to the successes of integration so far. Dugheim described the evolving relationships as follows: “Factions such as the Levant Front, Suqour al-Sham and Ahrar Al-Sham (SNA affiliated groups) slowly reconciled with HTS. Even though they received salaries from the interim government funded by Turkey and Qatar, they increasingly saw HTS as the only viable military force capable of taking on Assad.”
Indeed, my interviews with a Levant Front (part of SNA) security commander in August 2023 confirmed that mediation between the front and HTS had taken place after several fighters defected and joined the latter. This was one of HTS’ early infiltration strategies within the SNA, paving the way for subtle integration efforts. Today, Azzam Gharib, the central commander of the Levant Front, serves as the governor of Aleppo, with his former security commander as deputy. These defections were instrumental in shaping the coalition that led the final offensive and the smooth integration of factions before the victory speech by al-Sharaa, which formally dissolved the SNA and other armed groups.
This integration allowed HTS to create a specialized force before its offensive. HTS capitalized on its extensive financial network — built on taxation in Idlib, control of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and strategic investments — to establish 12 elite brigades, each named after prominent Islamic figures. According to Dugheim, these brigades are highly disciplined, with each fighter having cost $17,000 to train, resulting in a force of 35,000 fighters who played a pivotal role in the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation launched in late November 2024, leading to Assad’s overthrow on Dec. 8.
Following the fall of Assad, the Syrian Ministry of Defense laid out its organizational structure, completing appointments to senior positions in the General Command. According to interviews with insiders, the Ministry of Defense established six military divisions and appointed their commanders, alongside forming an air force and a new unit called the Republican Guard. But the appointments reveal a continuation of a loyalty-based policy, rather than one focused on competence. High-ranking positions were awarded primarily to individuals who had demonstrated loyalty to HTS during the years preceding Assad’s fall.
Among the most notable appointments was Brig. Gen. Abdul Rahman al-Khatib, a Jordanian national previously known as Abu Hussein al-Urduni, who was assigned to lead the newly formed Republican Guard. Khatib has been a figure trusted by al-Sharaa since the 2016 assassination of Abu Omar Saraqib (a prominent jihadist commander who worked with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, launched attacks against the rebellious Free Syrian Army and later spearheaded battles that enabled Islamist factions to seize control of Idlib province in 2015). Khatib played a key role in military planning and operations and since his appointment has focused on clearing the Syrian-Lebanese border of Hezbollah fighters, particularly around the strategic al-Qusayr area. Yet he is wanted for terrorism in Jordan and his appointment has raised concerns about potential complications with Jordanian authorities. Similarly, Brig. Gen. Omar Mohammed Jaftashi, a Turkish national known as Mukhtar al-Turki, was appointed to lead the Damascus Military Division. Jaftashi has long been one of al-Sharaa’s closest supporters, especially during moments of tension between al-Sharaa and foreign fighters within HTS. His appointment has fueled speculation about his potential role as a communications channel with Turkish intelligence, given his nationality. These appointments highlight a clear strategy of relying on foreign figures — perceived to have limited local ambitions — to safeguard the capital and ensure regime security. Following the same approach of prioritizing loyalty over competence, it was also expected that the man known as Abu Amsha would be the first leader from the SNA to be appointed as a division commander in the new army. He was indeed assigned to lead the Hama Military Division (25th Division). Abu Amsha, whose real name is Mohammed al-Jassem, had previously visited Idlib during disputes between HTS and the SNA and forged an alliance with al-Sharaa. Jassem led the Suleiman Shah Brigade, widely known as the Amshat Brigade, and is subject to U.S. sanctions for serious human rights violations.
Abu Amsha’s appointment raises questions about why Jolani would choose to appease a figure with such a notorious reputation. An internal source from within the Ministry of Defense revealed that al-Sharaa’s decision was influenced by Abu Amsha’s tribal power base. Given that the Suleiman Shah Brigade’s mobilization relies heavily on tribal networks, sidelining Abu Amsha could risk alienating these tribal networks and destabilizing the new military structure. However, al-Sharaa seems to have approached this appointment pragmatically. While recognizing Abu Amsha’s influence, he appears to be mitigating the risks of long-term reliance on such a controversial figure.
According to the same internal source, al-Sharaa has set conditions for Abu Amsha’s continued leadership within the new army. To maintain his position, Abu Amsha must establish a division of at least 12,000 fighters — a number he may struggle to mobilize given the current challenges facing armed groups in Syria. While this requirement might suggest a calculated effort to limit Abu Amsha’s influence, it remains uncertain whether the commander could leverage his tribal networks to sustain his position. Given his past as a warlord and the violations he is alleged to have committed, particularly against Kurds, should Abu Amsha succeed in maintaining his power base it could complicate civil-military relations, undermine governance and challenge the legitimacy of the military’s chain of command, potentially creating long-term obstacles to effective state-building.
The appointments also included Brig. Gen. Haitham al-Ali, formerly known as Abu Muslim Afs or al-Shami, as the commander of the Homs Military Division (103rd Division). Afs was among the military leaders of HTS who were arrested and tortured following accusations of involvement in an espionage scandal that rocked the group last year. However, he returned to his position as leader of the Ali ibn Abi Talib Brigade after al-Sharaa decided to close the case, which nearly caused a significant rift within the group.
Raed Arab was appointed as commander of the Tank Division. Previously, he led the Suqour al-Sham Brigade in the Tabakka region, which experienced internal defections in 2023 when Abu Issa al-Sheikh aligned with HTS. During my fieldwork that year, while monitoring the restructuring among SNA factions, I had the opportunity to interview Arab. I asked him about the reasons behind al-Sheikh’s defection, speculating that it might stem from either an ideological shift in the group’s motivations or pressure from Turkey to curtail the SNA’s influence.
Arab’s response was notably composed, showing no antagonism toward al-Sheikh, despite the fact that aligning with HTS at the time strengthened Jolani’s broader strategy of infiltrating and influencing the SNA. His perspective reflected a sense of strategic repositioning rather than ideological divergence. Arab explained that such alliances were viewed as a necessary revolutionary task and had been broadly accepted within certain factions of the SNA. Notably, he emphasized that these alignments with HTS were, in part, a response to pressure from Turkey, without explicitly acknowledging any ideological convergence between the SNA and HTS at the time.
In his new role, Arab is stationed in the Farqlas area in the eastern Homs countryside and also commands the Badia (“Desert”) Division, which operates in Palmyra and its surrounding areas. Originally from the town of al-Sukhnah in this region, Arab’s division is expected to play a key role in countering cells of the Islamic State group in the Syrian desert and securing major roads connecting eastern Syria to the country’s interior. While his appointment reflects the broader trend of integrating former SNA leaders into the new military structure, Arab’s history of pragmatic alliances suggests that his selection may be as much about strategic acumen as it is about loyalty.
In Idlib, Mohammed Ghareeb (aka Abu Usayd Houran) was appointed as commander of the Idlib Division. Ghareeb was a prominent leader in the Sham Legion, which was part of the National Liberation Front that operated alongside HTS within the Fath Mubeen (“Manifest Conquest”) operations room for years. The legion is considered close to Turkey and has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Idlib Division is expected to be deployed in the eastern sector of Idlib province, an area that is open to the desert, and bears responsibility for protecting roads and railways against Islamic State infiltration into the western part of the province.
In the highly sensitive southern province of Daraa, Binyan al-Hariri, a commander in the Ahrar al-Sham faction, was appointed as commander of the Daraa Division. The sensitivity stems from the refusal of al-Ouda, the leader of the 8th Brigade, to join the new Ministry of Defense and his rejection of its integration plan. Hariri will have to handle this delicate situation with great caution due to its internal and external ramifications.
The recent top-level appointments within Syria’s Ministry of Defense underscore al-Sharaa’s strategy of consolidating military power by selecting individuals with unwavering loyalty. These appointments include Marhaf Abu Qasrah, Ali Nour al-Din al-Nassan, Anad al-Darwish and Brig. Gen. Abdo Sarhan — key figures entrusted with leading Syria’s military transition in the aftermath of Assad’s overthrow.
Abu Qasrah, also known as Abu al-Hassan al-Hamwi, was appointed minister of defense on Dec. 21, 2024. Born in Halfaya, Hama Governorate, in 1984, he leveraged his engineering background to support the armed opposition, rising through the ranks of HTS and spearheading pivotal operations such as the “Deterrence of Aggression” campaign that led to Assad’s downfall. His appointment reflects al-Sharaa’s emphasis on appointing individuals who align with both HTS’ strategic goals and his broader vision for Syria’s future.
Al-Nassan, or Abu Yusuf al-Homsi, was promoted to major general on Dec. 31, 2024, and subsequently appointed chief of the general staff. A former officer in the Assad-era Syrian Arab Army who defected in 2011, al-Nassan’s operational success during the military campaigns that contributed to Assad’s overthrow positioned him as a key architect in rebuilding Syria’s military. Tasked with integrating diverse armed factions and modernizing the military, his appointment underscores the challenge of balancing loyalty with the need for professionalism and inclusivity.
Darwish, known as Abu al-Munthir, leads the Organization and Administration Division. He was the chief of staff for the National Liberation Front and military commander of Ahrar al-Sham. His rise to prominence followed his involvement in the 2020 internal coup within Ahrar al-Sham, which reshaped the group’s leadership with HTS’ backing. His appointment highlights al-Sharaa’s intention to consolidate control over military administration, ensuring that key roles are filled by figures whose loyalty is beyond question.
Sarhan, also known as Abu Asem, was appointed as the general commander of the air force, previously serving as the commander of Jabhat al-Nusra in Eastern Ghouta. Collectively, these appointments illustrate al-Sharaa’s pragmatic, loyalty-driven approach to military restructuring. While aimed at ensuring short-term stability and cohesion, the dominance of former HTS figures raises questions about the military’s capacity to represent Syria’s diverse population and evolve into a unified national institution. The long-term success of this approach depends on whether the military can move beyond factional loyalties and build a cohesive force that aligns with Syria’s broader aspirations for governance, security and justice.
Despite the official dissolution of armed factions and the Ministry of Defense’s recent appointments, one core issue remains largely unaddressed: the micro-level motivations that drive individual fighters. Recent findings from field research and interviews with SNA commanders reveal a persistent disconnect between the ministry’s top-down approach and the lived realities of fighters on the ground.
Over the past week, new insights have emerged from extensive interviews with central commanders, revealing a more complex and evolving picture of military integration under al-Sharaa’s leadership. While initial assessments underscored the fragility of this integration, recent developments suggest that the process is progressing, albeit with ongoing challenges.
The high-level restructuring within the Ministry of Defense, including the appointment of key leaders from former armed groups, reflects a centralized, loyalty-based strategy that risks further alienating rank-and-file fighters.
Motivations among fighters in the SNA are far from monolithic. Interviews highlight three primary motivations across the SNA’s corps: First, fighters are driven by loyalty and tribal solidarity (“asabiyya”), relying on kinship ties and trust in local leadership. Second, they are more incentivized by economic factors, with many engaged in smuggling and local market control. Third, some fighters, particularly those in the Levant Front, are ideologically motivated, sustaining revolutionary ideals and broader visions of societal change. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for successful integration into a unified national army. However, the Defense Ministry’s current strategy prioritizes consolidating power at the leadership level while neglecting the deeper factors that sustain fighters’ engagement and loyalty.
The question of whether al-Sharaa can successfully navigate these layered challenges remains open. However, the partial integration achieved so far between SNA and HTS — despite the exclusion of the SDF and southern factions — suggests some hope for a cohesive military structure. The revolutionary momentum following Assad’s fall has overshadowed past infighting and provided al-Sharaa with a level of legitimacy to pressure the SNA into accepting integration. His leadership has also strategically redirected military focus outward, emphasizing common enemies such as the SDF and Israel, rather than allowing internal divisions to dictate military dynamics.
Interviews with central commanders in the SNA highlight a grudging respect for al-Sharaa’s strategic intelligence and charisma. Despite their historical antagonism toward him, they acknowledge his ability to maneuver through rivalries, consolidate power and pragmatically push forward military integration. One commander noted that while integration remains “largely symbolic rather than structurally military,” al-Sharaa’s personal influence and tactical acumen have been instrumental in keeping the process afloat. His track record of sidelining rivals without provoking full-scale conflict has allowed him to cultivate a sense of national pride among commanders who, despite lingering reservations, now see military consolidation as essential to the transitional phase.
Beyond internal military calculations, al-Sharaa has effectively leveraged regional and international dynamics to his advantage. Turkish pressure on the SNA to integrate has been decisive, with Ankara viewing the restructuring of Syria’s armed forces as a means of stabilizing its own interests in northern Syria. Moreover, the surge in diplomatic visits and broader international engagement has added an external layer of legitimacy to al-Sharaa’s rule. The perception of a coordinated international effort to contain the Syrian crisis has indirectly eased tensions among the armed factions. Even if symbolic, this diplomatic momentum has reinforced the idea that integration is not merely a domestic necessity but a geopolitical reality.
While full military unification remains a distant goal, al-Sharaa’s control over Damascus provides a crucial foundation for his authority. Even if he cannot compel all factions to integrate, his consolidation of the capital’s security apparatus grants him a significant degree of legitimacy, both internally and externally. If these trends continue, al-Sharaa may not unify Syria in the near future, but his strategic positioning and control over the military landscape suggest that he is well-placed to maintain stability and assert his rule for years to come.
Amid bilateral meetings between SNA central commanders and the Ministry of Defense in the wake of Assad’s fall, I conducted in-depth interviews with leaders of SNA factions, during which I learned about deep-seated challenges that undermine this narrative of cohesion. In particular, three critical issues continue to obstruct genuine unification.
First, there is a genuine fear of accountability for wartime human rights violations that might have occurred during the fighting. Many faction leaders expressed apprehension regarding potential legal repercussions for such violations, underscoring the urgent need for the new administration to establish a credible framework for transitional justice and balance the demands for accountability with the necessity of reconciliation to prevent renewed violence.
Second, there are grave concerns about political marginalization.
Faction commanders voiced fears of being sidelined in the new political order, particularly with the integration of their fighters into the Ministry of Defense without guarantees of influence or autonomy. This anxiety highlights the importance of international oversight to ensure a transparent, inclusive integration process that mitigates the risks of exclusion and fragmentation.
Finally, there is a pressing need for HTS to build trust in its institutions. To address this, central commanders within the SNA have proposed establishing a “revolutionary military council” composed of eight to 12 revolutionary military leaders representing diverse components of Syria’s military landscape. This includes leaders from the Druze community, southern factions, the SDF and at least one representative from Assad’s military who defected to join the rebels.
The council’s primary objective is to promote inclusive leadership and foster balanced representation within Syria’s evolving military structure. By ensuring that no single faction dominates decision-making, the council aims to mitigate fears of marginalization, enhance mutual trust and establish a foundation for coordinated governance during Syria’s transitional phase. This initiative reflects a broader effort to create a military institution that represents the nation’s diverse communities while supporting long-term stability and unity.
The SDF and the southern factions remain two of the most significant challenges to building a unified national army under al-Sharaa’s leadership. The Ministry of Defense’s outreach to the SDF has faced numerous obstacles, primarily due to Turkey’s opposition and the SDF’s connections to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization.
Negotiations between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF leadership initially showed some progress. A senior figure close to the talks confirmed to New Lines that al-Sharaa offered to integrate Arab-majority units of the SDF while insisting on the withdrawal of foreign fighters associated with the PKK. However, Turkey’s intervention disrupted this process, with internal sources revealing that Ankara pushed for a complete dissolution of the SDF’s military structure rather than a partial integration. This hard-line stance risks isolating the SDF, which controls vast swaths of oil-rich territory in northeastern Syria.
In response, Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF, initially signaled a willingness to relocate PKK-affiliated fighters to Iraq or Iran, but Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs, rejected the compromise, insisting on broader concessions. This stalemate has delayed SDF integration, leaving a power vacuum in northeastern Syria.
Internal sources from both the Ministry of Defense and SDF confirm there is no military operation looming in the near future, however, an insider informant in the negotiations has said that there is an international party leading these negotiations mediating a possible deal to avoid such a confrontation, involving SDF concessions over control of certain areas in the east.
This option appears increasingly viable, given growing internal divisions among the populace living under SDF control and dissatisfaction among Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. One tribal leader from Deir ez-Zor told me that “SDF governance has marginalized Arab communities and monopolized decision-making.” Such grievances could increase pressure on the SDF to accept territorial concessions as part of a broader settlement, especially in areas where trust in its leadership has significantly declined.
In the south, the situation is equally complex. The southern factions, particularly in Daraa and Sweida, have shown little interest in integrating into the new national military. Led by al-Ouda, the Daraa factions maintain a delicate relationship with Russia and have refused to fully commit to the Ministry of Defense’s integration plan.
In Sweida, local Druze militias like Rijal al-Karama (“Men of Dignity”) have remained independent, demanding political guarantees and local autonomy before agreeing to any integration. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, a prominent Druze leader, emphasized that the southern factions will not disarm without assurances of political representation and protection from external threats like the Islamic State. This distrust reflects years of marginalization and the memory of brutal crackdowns under the Assad regime.
The security situation in southern Syria is further complicated by Israel’s ongoing airstrikes, which have destroyed military infrastructure and hardware, and its occupation of new territory in the Golan Heights, in violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement. Israel has also targeted Iranian-linked militias and weapons depots. Since Assad’s fall in December, Israel has launched over 500 airstrikes on southern Syria, particularly in Damascus, Sweida and Daraa provinces.
Recent attacks include a strike on the military airport in Sweida, destroying weapons storage facilities; targeted drone attacks in Daraa and along the Syrian-Lebanese border, disrupting militia supply lines; and continuous bombardment of positions linked to Lebanese Hezbollah in the Damascus suburbs.
These airstrikes have heightened tensions in the south and created significant challenges for the Ministry of Defense, which must ensure border security and counter smuggling networks while navigating regional rivalries. Moreover, the lack of a cohesive southern military structure makes the area vulnerable to further destabilization, complicating efforts to restore security and rebuild trust.
The Ministry of Defense’s plan to integrate former Assad regime figures has sparked outrage due to its lack of transparency. The appointment of controversial figures like Fadi Saqr, implicated in the Tadamon Massacre, who previously worked on the regime’s legal campaigns, has fueled public anger. Victims’ families and human rights groups have demanded clarity on the criteria used for these appointments, warning that the absence of a transparent transitional justice framework could destabilize the fragile political order.
Reconciliation with criminals from the former regime remains one of the most contentious issues. Adding to the complexity, interviews with Assad-era officers, including generals and brigadiers, have revealed a mix of cautious optimism and palpable uncertainty. While these officers described the process of disarmament and status settlements as relatively smooth, their demeanor suggested unease about their future roles. Many appeared uncertain about whether they would be integrated into the restructured army or sidelined entirely, leaving them in a state of limbo that could destabilize the transition. Hundreds of thousands of state employees were expelled and ousted with no clear process. A transitional justice council under international supervision could offer a path forward by balancing accountability with reconciliation.
Despite the narrative of military unification under the Ministry of Defense, Syria’s transition remains fraught with uncertainty. While the integration of SNA factions into the ministry was carefully planned over the last three years, the process remains structurally fragile. The absence of the SDF and southern factions signals the deep fractures that remain in Syria’s military landscape.
The path to building a cohesive national army in Syria is fraught with complexities. While military unification is essential for political stability and preventing further conflict, it remains a fragile and high-risk process. The Ministry of Defense’s integration plan reflects a pragmatic effort to consolidate military power but, without inclusive governance, trust-building and a transparent transitional justice framework, its success remains uncertain.
HTS’ rise has demonstrated its ability to consolidate and co-opt rival factions, yet the real challenge lies in maintaining unity and legitimacy in a post-Assad Syria. The integration of SNA factions under al-Sharaa’s leadership was not a sudden development — it was carefully facilitated over the past three years, involving quiet mediation and gradual alignment. However, this does not guarantee long-term stability. While leadership-level agreements have helped bridge factional divisions, the motivations of individual fighters remain a critical challenge. Many continue to carry grievances, ideological commitments or fears of marginalization, which could undermine military cohesion if not addressed through meaningful reconciliation efforts.
One of the most pressing unresolved issues in al-Sharaa’s Syria is the ambiguity surrounding transitional justice. While calls for accountability are widespread — both among victims of the Assad regime and rival factions who suffered from HTS abuses in the past — the new leadership has remained vague about its approach to dealing with prior human rights violations. This ambiguity is a reflection not merely of strategic hesitation but also of deep-seated insecurity within the ruling administration.
HTS, which now plays a dominant role in Syria’s security apparatus, has its own history of human rights abuses and war crimes. Opening the door to transitional justice risks exposing the group’s leadership to scrutiny, particularly regarding old allegations made by Abu Ahmad Zakour, a former leader who defected from HTS in April 2024. After escaping HTS’ control, Zkour released audio recordings accusing Jolani of involvement in an Atameh explosion that targeted commanders in rival groups. Adding to this are the widespread forced disappearances attributed to HTS’ former security branches. There is growing unease among SNA central commanders, some of whom have privately expressed their intentions to pursue legal action against al-Sharaa in his capacity as the former HTS leader. This internal friction explains why al-Sharaa has been reluctant to address these concerns — doing so would risk internal fractures within the new military structure.
Moreover, the case of Fadi Saqr, the former regime commander linked to the Tadamon Massacre, illustrates the contradictions in the current approach. Saqr was briefly arrested, only to be released a few hours later, reappearing in the same Damascus neighborhood where he had previously wielded power. His release triggered protests from families of massacre victims, signaling a growing frustration with the leadership’s opaque approach to justice. If figures like Saqr can be reintegrated without consequence, it raises serious concerns about whether justice will be applied equitably or will instead serve merely as a political tool.
According to SNA commanders interviewed after Assad’s fall, the success of Syria’s military integration will depend on three immediate steps, starting with the establishment of a transparent transitional justice council. Without clear accountability measures, fears of persecution will persist, weakening trust in the new order. The proposed military revolutionary council for power-sharing must reflect factional diversity. Otherwise, it risks sidelining groups who may resort to armed opposition. There should be a new security framework for southern Syria and the SDF, which remains outside integration efforts, largely due to Turkish intervention. A negotiated pathway is required to ensure their involvement. Meanwhile, Israel’s actions continue to destabilize southern Syria, further complicating the integration of factions in Daraa and Sweida.
Ultimately, the success of Syria’s transition hinges on al-Sharaa’s ability to centralize military power without alienating key players or reigniting factional rivalries. Failure to address fighters’ grievances and external pressures risks plunging the country back into fragmentation and renewed conflict.
Beyond the SNA, integrating the SDF and southern factions remains a complex challenge. The SDF’s reluctance to disband, southern factions’ demands for autonomy and ongoing Israeli airstrikes underscore the fragile nature of Syria’s military transition. The Ministry of Defense must strike a delicate balance between preserving local autonomy and fostering national cohesion, while addressing Turkey’s geopolitical interests and ensuring that reconciliation efforts are both transparent and inclusive.
Syria’s military unification ultimately depends on building political legitimacy and establishing robust institutions that address the concerns of armed groups, victims of past conflicts and regional stakeholders. Without clear guarantees of political representation, protection and transitional justice, these groups are unlikely to fully commit. The ministry’s success will rest on inclusive governance, credible reconciliation mechanisms and sustained economic support — without which Syria risks sliding back into cycles of violence and instability.
Furthermore, the failure of past international sanctions on Assad’s regime provides a cautionary lesson. Sanctions did not collapse the authoritarian structure but rather pushed the regime to create deeply entrenched illicit economic networks that became integral to both governance and conflict economies. These same networks now persist under the new leadership in Damascus. The challenge facing al-Sharaa’s administration is not just military consolidation but also dismantling these economic structures without creating new power vacuums that criminal networks or rival factions could exploit.
As Syria navigates this transitional period, al-Sharaa’s ability to balance power consolidation, factional grievances, economic reforms and external pressures will determine whether the fragile peace holds — or if Syria is destined for another cycle of instability.
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