The question of alcohol regulation in Syria, recently raised by secular advocates, is far from a minor detail. It strikes at the core of the discussions about the future nature of the Syrian state. The statement by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), during a recent BBC interview that the country is dealing with more serious challenges at this stage was undermined by his own admission that legal experts drafting Syria’s future constitution were looking into this very issue as well. Framing alcohol regulation as a constitutional matter places it within the broader debate over Islam’s role in governance — a matter of profound significance.
There might be more immediate and urgent concerns at this stage, such as economic relief and finding alternative oil supplies as winter sets in. But that does not decrease the importance of a debate about the nature of the state we want to see emerge in the country. And no, it does not matter if the questions about this are sometimes posed by Western journalists.
A likely proposal in the upcoming constitutional discussions will be to declare Islam as the official state religion, as is customary in most Arab-majority countries, with Lebanon’s and Syria’s constitutions being exceptions. However, Syria’s most recent constitution — last modified in 2012, until it was annulled by HTS earlier this month — already identified Islamic jurisprudence as a major source of legislation. Will this now evolve to grant the state authority to ban alcohol production, consumption and importation, impose sex segregation in public spaces and Islamic dress code on women, and legislate other moral issues? Or will the new constitution retain its vague phrasing, delegating interpretation to legislators and the judiciary, thus leaving the door open for concerns over potential bans and restrictions that could happen at any moment in the future?
Secularists argue for the removal of such clauses altogether, so as to avoid any grey areas in the constitution that could be usurped by ideologues. In other words, the state should belong to all Syrians — individuals and communities — with no potential backdoor for it to be controlled by a small ideological elite.
Let’s not forget that most members of the official Islamic establishment in the country will likely retain their positions, despite their loyalty to the Bashar al-Assad regime throughout the conflict. Exceptions include a few figures, such as the former Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassoun, who fled to Europe shortly after HTS took over Aleppo. But the remaining members will likely join — and be welcomed by — their HTS colleagues in calling for some form of Islamic governance, potentially including the imposition of strictures like a ban on alcohol. For many of them, this moment represents an opportunity to push for policies they have long desired but were too constrained to advocate. Under the Assads, they were granted significant leeway over education and personal status laws — the overseeing of marriage, divorce and inheritance — which remained under the religious control of the clergy of each sect and religious community in Syria. In return, the Islamists were expected to avoid overstepping certain boundaries, like pushing for an alcohol ban.
Historically, alcohol consumption in the Middle East, including during Islamic rule, was an accepted facet of daily life, with taverns ubiquitous. But modern Islamist movements have weaponized alcohol bans and strict dress codes as symbols of moral superiority and “authenticity,” often coupled with populist sentiments about opposing “colonial influences.” These measures became instruments in their broader ideological struggles, distinguishing them from other political movements while resisting modernization efforts imposed by the ruling elite that governed most Middle Eastern states after independence.
This debate, therefore, is not a trivial matter to be shelved for later. The fiery exchanges that have been taking place on social media over the last few days underscore the centrality of this issue in the ongoing transition of the country. If it were a mere detail, it would not generate such interest and inspire so much anger on both sides. The debate encapsulates the fundamental question of who controls Syria’s state and society.
Under Assad’s regime, the state’s justification for its authoritarianism, at least when West-facing, was “to protect minorities,” though Syrians knew that the regime operated in practice as a personal fiefdom. Today, Islamists seek to claim the state in the name of religiosity and authenticity, adhering to rigid interpretations of religion while resisting efforts to modernize Islamic law (Sharia). This mindset has already manifested in HTS’s prior governance in Idlib, suggesting that its current pragmatism is likely a tactical ploy, not a shift toward genuine participatory governance. The revolutionary legitimacy it now enjoys after toppling the Assad regime in such spectacular fashion further reinforces its position.
Advocates for a pluralistic state, including religious minorities and many intellectuals, are understandably alarmed. They fear the imposition of an oppressive Islamic rule that marginalizes them and undermines democratic principles such as free elections, peaceful transfers of power and respect for individual and communal rights. These groups face significant challenges under Islamist-dominated systems. They are dismissed by their critics as “frivolous,” for example, when bringing up whether alcohol will be banned in the new Syria, a concern scorned as elitist and unimportant in comparison to the other challenges facing the country at this stage. They are “inauthentic” or even “traitorous” in their support for secular rule, considered counterrevolutionary or as pawns of a Western culture war. Yet these dissenters see themselves as cultural stewards and guardians of societal progress, offering a counternarrative to the more conservative visions of governance. This perspective inevitably clashes with the Islamists’ assertion that it is they who are the protectors of social mores. Despite past control and manipulation under Assad’s regime, when many were silenced and cajoled or coerced into compliance, everyone — including those calling for a secular state — now has an opportunity to express their true beliefs and help shape the emerging state. However, with limited organizational and military leverage and a recent history of alignment with the regime — a position involving many among their rank-and-file — the secularists’ legitimacy and popular appeal remain contested. Nevertheless, their valid views, legitimate concerns and potential contributions to Syria’s development make their inclusion critical.
Misconceptions about those advocating for a more inclusive and pluralistic governance model add complexity to the debate. Many among the country’s conservative populace seem to assume that advocates for a secular state belong solely to the affluent or cultural elites, such as artists and actors and high-profile influencers. While some prominent intellectuals and artists fit this description, groups like the Kurdish community — overwhelmingly secular in orientation — include large segments living below the poverty line, a plight shared by 90% of Syrians today. Similarly, most of the country’s intellectuals and artists struggle to maintain their precarious middle-class status amid economic collapse.
The broader contest between Islamist and secular ideologies carries profound implications for Syria’s intellectual and artistic communities. The challenges faced by Iranian creatives since the establishment of the Islamic Republic serve as a cautionary tale. Sunni Islamist movements, of which HTS is one, often adopt even stricter positions on artistic and intellectual freedoms, fueling legitimate fears among actors, painters, sculptors, writers and others whose work plays a critical role in molding societal identity. For these individuals, alcohol regulation symbolizes the larger cultural and ideological battles shaping Syria’s future. The country’s reputation for vibrant intellectual and artistic contributions underscores the importance of their inclusion in ongoing discussions. Syria’s regional reputation owes a lot to its intellectual and artistic communities. Sidelining them would undermine that reputation.
In Egypt, the intellectual and artistic communities faced a similar dilemma during the early days of the Arab Spring. Initially, they accepted — and in some cases actively supported — the rise of Islamists as the country’s new leaders. However, when the Islamists failed to manage the diverse expectations of society and the country appeared headed toward deeper Islamization, those communities turned against them, ultimately backing the army-led coup of 2013. Syria, while having a smaller population, faces far greater societal fissures after its prolonged conflict. Although an army-led coup is unlikely — since the old army has effectively been replaced by rebel factions — we should not underestimate the potential for widespread discontent, which could have ramifications far beyond the intellectual and artistic communities.
One of the very first actions of the defunct Assad regime in the early days of the revolution was to task its vice president, Farouk al-Sharaa (no relation to the HTS leader), with holding a series of public debates about the country’s future. These debates included representatives from the political opposition as well as the intellectual and artistic communities (including my mother, the Syrian actress Muna Wassef). However, this effort was largely performative, conducted while the army brutally cracked down on peaceful protesters. What Syria needs today are not gestures but genuine engagement and meaningful debate.
For HTS, the choice is clear: continue the Assad-era tactics of stalling, bribery, intimidation and playing one community or social segment against another, or embrace genuine inclusivity by allowing diverse voices to participate in shaping Syria’s future, regardless of past history or power imbalances. Notably, HTS’s leader recently invited the same Farouk al-Sharaa, now 86 years old, to attend a national dialogue. Much will depend on whether this initiative reflects authentic engagement or merely repeats the performative gestures of the past.
In addition to this, the reconstruction and redevelopment of Syria after years of devastation require significant international investment. Reviving and expanding the tourism sector are also essential. Both goals demand fewer social restrictions and accommodations for foreign visitors. Creating a system that treats foreigners and Syrians differently — effectively granting more rights or personal freedom to foreigners — risks fostering discontent. This is particularly risky in a country with a long history of social openness and a way of life accommodating diverse moral and cultural norms.
From a practical perspective, HTS leaders should also consider the historical consequences of alcohol prohibition. States that enacted such bans inevitably experienced the rise of black markets, which often expanded into other contraband and fostered systemic corruption. Modern examples abound, demonstrating how these measures undermine governance and erode public trust. Under the Assad regime, due to lingering socialist restrictions and international sanctions, Syria became a veritable smugglers’ paradise. But HTS leaders’ declared belief in free-market economics and their removal of various import taxes represent an important break from this legacy. To avoid undermining these efforts, they should be cautious not to create new opportunities for black markets to flourish.
If HTS aims for effective governance, reconstruction and stability, it must recognize that pragmatic conservatism — modeled on Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party — is the path forward. By behaving as a conservative political party within a civil-state framework, HTS could earn broader societal support, even from secularists. Once the foundational questions about state identity are settled in a manner acceptable to all, Syrians will prioritize practical governance over ideological purity, as is the case with most countries around the world. At this pivotal juncture, Syrians’ votes will likely go to those who promise effective, ethical governance that improves livelihoods and living conditions.
The alcohol debate, therefore, is not merely about a beverage or lifestyle. It symbolizes deeper questions about governance, societal values and the balance between religious and secular ideologies. For HTS, addressing this issue thoughtfully could signal a commitment to inclusivity, modernity and effective governance. How it navigates this debate will ultimately define the kind of state it aspires to build — and whether it can gain the trust and support of a fractured but hopeful nation.
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