A one-minute video, filmed the day after the Syrian city of Aleppo fell to opposition forces and just days before the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, captured the attention of the Alawite community across its geographic and virtual presence in late December. The footage shows the shrine of al-Khasibi, the founder of the Alawite sect, burning in Aleppo. Armed individuals speaking the Uzbek language are visible in the video, allegedly linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the rebel group that spearheaded the lightning offensive that toppled Assad on Dec. 8.
The Military Operations Directorate in Syria stated that the incident occurred before HTS had fully taken control of Aleppo. It further suggested that the timing of the video’s circulation was deliberate, aiming to stoke sectarian strife. Iranian factions and remnants of the former regime were implied to be behind this provocation.
The video sparked outrage within Alawite communities in areas such as Masyaf, Latakia, Jableh, Tartous and Baniyas. On Dec. 26, 2024, protests erupted, condemning the desecration of the shrine without directly naming those responsible. In Latakia, approximately 5,000 people gathered at major intersections, in a demonstration that nearly descended into violence. Armed individuals fired into the air, reportedly causing the death of a child near the Military Naval Command, further inflaming tensions.
In Homs, clashes broke out in Alawite neighborhoods between residents and General Security forces, resulting in documented casualties and injuries. Meanwhile, in the religiously mixed coastal city of Baniyas, protests occurred without direct confrontations involving security forces or HTS. Demonstrators persisted from noon until evening, prompting the Military Operations Directorate to impose a two-day curfew across the coastal and Homs governorates.
The video gained widespread attention a day after Iran’s foreign minister ominously declared that Syria’s current rulers should brace for future surprises. This statement shifted suspicion toward Tehran, which stood accused of agitating the Alawite community. Although Iran has largely receded from the Syrian landscape following Assad’s fall, its influence — and that of its proxies — remains present, which suggests that this provocation may be part of broader regional maneuvers.
Al-Hussein ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi, who lived in the 10th century, is regarded as a foundational figure of Alawite beliefs. He played a pivotal role in shaping the sect’s doctrines and establishing its literary heritage. To this day, his most renowned work, “Al-Risala al-Rustabashiya” (the latter a Persian term meaning “be upright” or “straightforward”), remains central to educating young male adherents in Alawite rituals.
During the 11th and 12th centuries, Alawites began settling in Syria, where they are now the country’s largest minority — constituting 10% to 12% of the population — and are predominantly concentrated in Latakia, Tartous, Homs and the countryside of Hama. Historically marginalized, the Alawites gained significant influence after the Assad family’s rise to power following a coup in 1970, transitioning from isolated mountain communities to urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo and assuming a dominant role in government and security institutions.
The al-Khasibi Shrine in Aleppo, central to this narrative, is situated within the courtyard of an old military base known as al-Qashla. The base was constructed in the 1830s by Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the former ruler of Egypt, who incorporated the nearby Sheikh Yabraq Shrine into its grounds. Since the start of its restoration and expansion in 2017, the shrine has been a source of considerable controversy in Syria. The work was undertaken on the direct orders of Col. Suhail al-Hassan, a figure popularly known as “The Tiger,” who is now among the individuals most wanted by the new government in Damascus. Two months after the regime regained full control of Aleppo’s eastern neighborhoods, al-Hassan visited the shrine. Images circulated on social media showed him flanked by members of the “Tiger Forces” and close associates around the shrine, which was draped in green cloth — a sacred color for Alawites.
The shrine’s identity is contested. Residents of Aleppo assert that it does not belong to al-Khasibi but to Sheikh Shams al-Din Muhammad al-Rifai al-Ahmadi, locally known as “Sheikh Yabraq” (a corruption of the Arabic word “bairaq,” meaning “lightning” or “flag”). Sheikh Yabraq, a revered figure in 15th-century Aleppo, was widely sought for his blessings. Alawite narratives attribute the confusion over the shrine’s true identity to Muhammad Amin al-Taweel, author of the first modern history of the Alawites (“The History of the Alawites,” published in 1921). Al-Taweel’s work is often criticized for its inaccuracies and omissions. Some accounts claim al-Khasibi’s actual grave is located at a site known as Ahl al-Bayt Hill, near the Citadel of Aleppo. Other Alawite traditions, however, conflate the figures of Sheikh Yabraq and al-Khasibi.
The shrine’s restoration was carried out with Iranian support, reflecting broader efforts by Tehran to rehabilitate key religious sites in Syria. Similar projects include the Dot Shrine — believed by Shiite tradition to hold a drop of the Imam Hussein’s blood — as well as the Owais al-Qarni Shrine in Raqqa, the shrines of Zainab and Ruqayya in Damascus and several others in Deir ez-Zor and beyond.
In the hours following the fall of the Assad regime, video clips flooded social media showing citizens and fighters from Syrian Islamist opposition factions repeating the phrase: “Glory be to Him who has honored us and humiliated you.” The phrase was prominently chanted after opposition forces captured Syrian army positions and detained regime soldiers. It also echoed in the coastal regions — traditional strongholds of the regime during the rule of both Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar — targeting Alawite civilians and military personnel in Tartous, Latakia and Qardaha. These scenes fueled deep anxiety and fear among members of the Alawite sect.
The phrase itself carries potent symbolic weight in Islamic history; it is often invoked at pivotal moments to signal a divine justification for the rise of a new ruler and the fall of the old. It embodies the idea that such transitions are driven less by human effort than by divine intervention. In this context, its repetition after the regime’s collapse symbolized a dramatic rupture between the past era and the emerging future in Syria — a country that once birthed the Umayyad Caliphate, the first Arab Islamic empire. Many social media posts celebrated this shift, claiming that “Umayyad rule” had returned to Damascus.
The deep symbolism of “Glory be to Him who has honored us and humiliated you” shows the dichotomy between victor and vanquished. For one side, it reflects triumph and vindication; for the other, humiliation and defeat. Today, the Syrian conflict is often framed as a battle between Sunnis and Alawites, with other communities, such as the Druze and Kurds, maintaining a more peripheral stance. This stark polarization is also reflected in the rhetoric of Damascus’ de facto leadership, in which modern terms like “citizenship,” “Syrian identity,” “democracy” and “transfer of power” are conspicuously absent.
The videos also evoke decades of systematic repression by the Assad regime, for which the Alawite sect is widely held responsible. Among Syrian Sunnis, Alawites are often viewed as accomplices to the crimes perpetrated by Assad’s forces — crimes that came to light on a massive scale following the regime’s collapse. These include atrocities committed against detainees in a sprawling network of prisons in Damascus, where over 15 documented facilities — not including secret detention centers — held countless individuals who were effectively erased from public memory.
The notorious Sednaya prison, a grim symbol of the regime’s brutality, revealed the presence of detainees held for decades, including one individual imprisoned for 40 years. Simultaneously, mass graves containing thousands of victims were discovered, sparking outrage among Syrians toward the regime’s base which, while largely composed of Alawites, also involved other Syrian sects to a considerable extent.
The issues of detainees and mass graves ignited fury against Alawites, compounding the unrest that followed their demonstrations against the burning of the al-Khasibi shrine. Comparisons arose, highlighting the sect’s silence over the regime’s devastating actions against Syria’s Sunni Arab majority — including bombings, shelling and the destruction of cities, villages and religious sites — versus their outcry over the burning of a single religious site of questionable historic authenticity.
On the ground, jihadist groups have long been confined to limited territory in the country, restricted largely to Idlib and parts of Aleppo’s countryside, though they continued to harass and commit violence against minorities near the front lines, including Christians, Alawites and Druze. With security in chaos and no local resistance to oppose them, jihadist fighters escaped the confines of their territories and spread to other parts of Syria. Some reached Homs, a city evenly divided between Alawites and Sunnis. Others, particularly foreign fighters, were reported to have torched a Christmas tree in Christian-majority Suqaylabiyah and attacked a church in the same town. Local accounts also suggest their presence in Talkalakh, near the Lebanese border.
The administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto leader, appears reluctant to confront these fighters directly. It avoids clashes with them, likely seeking to maintain their cooperation during a critical period. This was evident from Sharaa’s statement suggesting the possibility of granting these fighters Syrian citizenship. At the same time, the administration is wary of their uncontrolled expansion, which could lead to unmanageable outcomes.
To handle this delicate balance, the administration resorts to presenting incidents as isolated and containable. It has publicly claimed arrests of certain jihadists without clear evidence of such arrests. Similarly, it discusses confrontations with remnants of the Assad regime without providing specific names of those pursued or their connections to the fallen regime.
The Alawite community is currently grappling with its worst existential fears, as its members face the uncertainty of the coming days. Their growing anxiety stems not only from the severed ties with the former regime, which they once bitterly resented, but also from the sweeping changes that are gradually erasing their presence from key positions within the Syrian state, including public-sector employment.
A mass dismissal of thousands of employees appears to be part of a deliberate effort by the new government. Without any legal justification, senior administrators across Syrian institutions are being replaced with appointees of questionable competence. For instance, a director of an agricultural institution is said to be functionally illiterate. New administrators are interviewing public-service employees, asking intrusive questions about their places of birth and sectarian affiliations and making decisions about their employment based on these details.
Moreover, rumors are circulating that government employees who have worked 25 out of their 30 years of service are to be forcibly retired. Meanwhile, thousands of retirees from the now-dissolved Syrian army have been ordered to vacate their homes in Damascus suburbs such as Dimas and al-Wurud by the end of the current academic year (some have children in local schools), with no alternative housing provided. These homes have become frequent targets of robberies, leaving displaced Alawites no choice but to return to their impoverished villages, where they face dire conditions — poverty, hunger, lack of property and the absence of regional or international support.
Adding to their fears, extremist factions have circulated calls for mass violence against Alawites. On the Telegram messaging service, tags and videos have proliferated, advocating indiscriminate slaughter. Some voices have condemned the Damascus government for even considering dialogue with Alawite leaders, though others demanded accountability for incidents targeting the community.
The threats of mass violence or arrests loom large, amplifying fears of collective punishment for the Alawites’ role in the former regime. Even those with no ties to Assad’s government feel targeted. Reports from the coastal regions describe premeditated killings of Alawite individuals with apparent connections to the regime. For example, a young man returning from his brother’s wedding was killed. Bodies are being found in deserted areas. In Homs’ al-Sabil neighborhood, at least five people were reportedly killed by an armed group dressed in HTS uniforms, shortly after Christmas.
Explanations for these incidents vary. Some attempts to vindicate HTS have blamed remnants of the former regime or criminal gangs unleashed by a general amnesty issued by Sharaa, which released individuals convicted of crimes, including murder. However, the spread of such violence seems more pervasive and systematic.
Alawites also view the appointments made by the Damascus government with deep unease. The government, acting more like a permanent authority than a caretaker administration, has appointed figures with ties to Islamist movements. For example, the new governor of Tartous, Anas Ayrout from Baniyas, once issued a fatwa declaring residents of areas formerly loyal to the regime to be infidels deserving death. In Homs, the new governor justified barring women from judicial or defense roles by citing their “biological nature.” The new governor of Latakia, Hassan Soufan, openly endorsed the Sharaa government’s intention to implement aspects of Islamic law, citing concerns about women’s behavior on Syrian streets.
The Alawite community, a Sufi sect, is grappling with a profound loss of leadership. Lacking a unified “marjaa” (religious or political “reference”), the community finds itself fragmented. This void is evident in the numerous statements issued by Alawite clerics, many of whom hold little authority over the wider community. These clerics have called for a general amnesty for all Syrians, a proposal rejected by Alawite civil forces, who demand accountability for crimes committed by all parties. Other factions have turned to political activism, attempting to establish national parties and bodies, particularly leftist movements, which have also found positive responses among Sunni Syrians who reject the rule of HTS under Sharaa.
Among the Alawite voices, the most prominent — albeit with limited influence — are those advocating a distinction between the sect and the Assad regime. They argue that, like other Syrian communities, the Alawites suffered under Assad’s oppressive policies, mismanagement and corruption.
In the current climate of chaos, in which armed factions dominate, some Alawites — particularly in mountainous regions — have refused to surrender their weapons to HTS or the General Security Forces. This refusal is driven by a deep mistrust of HTS, which has struggled to shed its jihadist image, and skepticism about its ability to ensure stability in Syria. The Alawites see no justification for disarmament as long as other armed factions continue to pose a threat to Syria’s fragile civil peace. Their stance has been bolstered by similar refusals from the Druze in southern Syria and the Ahmad al-Awdat factions in the south. While some Alawites have handed over their weapons, HTS has largely failed to gain the community’s trust.
The clearest manifestation of Alawite fears has emerged in rural Hama, where more than 20 Alawite villages were reportedly raided by armed groups wearing military uniforms resembling those of HTS or other opposition factions. These raids resulted in displacement, theft and killings, with survivors fleeing to safer areas.
Amid this climate of fear, some Alawite clerics and community leaders have attempted to reconcile with HTS, welcoming its representatives from Idlib and issuing public statements of support for the new government. While these gestures reflect attempts to forge new alliances, they have sparked criticism within the community. Many see these actions as pragmatic, rather than rooted in genuine confidence in HTS or the future government. HTS’ administration is perceived as favoring Sunni factions from Idlib while excluding other Syrians, including Sunnis from major cities like Damascus and Aleppo.
The challenges facing the Alawite community are compounded by dire economic and security conditions. Many Alawites feel trapped between the threats of jihadist factions and HTS’ efforts to rebrand itself as a moderate force to the international community. Hunger has become widespread in Alawite areas, with families unable to afford basic necessities like bread. Tobacco, the primary crop of the Alawite mountains, can no longer be sold at the subsidized prices that made it profitable and salaries for military and civilian employees are no longer reliable.
This volatile situation creates fertile ground for international and regional interference. Iran, in particular, is likely to exploit the instability to regain influence in its former strongholds. Meanwhile, remnants of the Assad regime are advocating for the establishment of an independent Alawite state, reminiscent of the French-created statelet of the 1920s. This push is driven by the enduring fear of extremist Islamist rule in Syria. Russia, once a significant player in the coastal regions, now faces widespread resentment from the Alawite community, prompting its withdrawal with little regret from the local population.
In a desperate bid to regain some stability, Alawite clerics are exploring the creation of a supreme council for sectarian affairs, akin to those established by the Druze, Ismailis and Christians. This long-held aspiration was suppressed under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, who insisted on Syria’s nominally secular identity. However, the feasibility of such a council is uncertain, given the difficulty of achieving representative leadership within the Alawite community, even with potential Turkish support.
In the current Syrian landscape, the new regime’s insistence on monopolizing governance risks igniting a counterrevolution, one supported by powerful Arab states. For nations such as the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, the success of the current experiment with political Islam in Damascus would be a disaster for their own stability. This possibility has fueled efforts to exploit divisions within Syria, with the Syrian coast emerging as a prime target.
Today, the Alawites face an uncertain future that hinges on the ability of the government in Damascus to reassure the international community that it can pursue an inclusive transition process. To that end, the Sharaa government is working urgently to prevent mass atrocities on the coast, investing significant effort to maintain stability. Meanwhile, remnants of the old regime are regaining influence, particularly in Damascus, where real political maneuvering appears to be underway.
To avoid falling into competing systems of international guardianship, many argue that inclusive governance is the only viable path forward — not just during the transitional period, set to end in March, but also through the political processes that follow, such as forming a transitional council and drafting a new constitution. While Sharaa has made gestures of goodwill and offered reassurances, these alone are insufficient for building a new Syrian state.
The actions of the de facto government, which continues to appoint leaders of state institutions predominantly from one political, religious and sectarian group, have cast doubt on its willingness to relinquish power by March. Syrians across the country — not just Alawites — are skeptical of these promises. Despite enduring years of hardship, there is growing readiness to demand a future that does not reproduce dictatorship, even if in a Sunni guise.
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