As King Abdullah II of Jordan meets President Donald Trump today, the encounter is being closely watched — not just in Washington and Amman but across the Middle East. Jordan’s king, often seen as a pragmatic actor balancing regional and global interests, is no longer merely playing the role of a cautious mediator. Instead, he is emerging as a central figure in what could be described as a new geopolitical resistance: a challenge to U.S.-led, Israeli-driven realignment efforts in the region.
This shift is not just about Jordan’s immediate concerns; it reflects a broader recalibration of alliances, one that anticipates a post-American world order. With Trump returning to power, bringing his transactional approach to foreign policy, Arab states and their monarchies are reassessing their long-term positions. And Abdullah appears to be leading that charge.
At the heart of Jordan’s growing unease is the resurfacing of an old and dangerous idea — that the Palestinian issue can be resolved by simply moving Palestine’s residents elsewhere. Israeli officials and Trump-aligned voices in Washington have been repeatedly pushing proposals that would deny Palestinians the right of return to Gaza and instead resettle them in neighboring Arab states. Trump has announced his intention to “clean out that whole thing,” referring to Gaza. Netanyahu recently dismissed Saudi Arabia’s demand for a Palestinian state, instead suggesting that Riyadh could create one within its own borders.
For Jordan, these statements are more than diplomatic provocations; they are existential threats, and ones that the country has witnessed before. In 1970, tensions between the Jordanian state and Palestinian factions erupted into a period of wholesale violence known as “Black September.” King Hussein and the Jordanian army went head to head against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, in an outright civil war. The memory of that violence between Jordanians and a large Palestinian population is very close to the surface in discussions of Palestinian migration into the small territory, a common fear being that a forced displacement of Palestinians could destabilize Jordan’s delicate social fabric, straining its already fragile economy and provoking unrest among the tribes and security apparatus that underpin the Hashemite monarchy.
This comes after more than a year of war that has reawakened the Palestinian cause across the Arab world, particularly among younger generations. What was once viewed as a stagnant issue overshadowed by economic and geopolitical concerns has now become a revived symbol of resistance and identity. Jordan has been treading a delicate path between its majority-Palestinian population and its allies, including Israel and America, but these latest provocations make that balancing act unsustainable. Abdullah’s options are shrinking, but this increasingly pressured situation might result in a resistance previously unseen in the Arab world, and he has cards to play that other countries do not.
In the days leading up to his U.S. visit, Abdullah has engaged in a diplomatic blitz, reinforcing Jordan’s position ahead of his meeting with Trump. He held calls with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed, and Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani — three Gulf leaders who, despite their differences, are increasingly aligned on key regional security concerns. He also met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and spoke with U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres before stopping in London to meet with King Charles III.
The symbolism of these engagements is unmistakable. The Arab monarchies, which survived the Arab Spring largely by supporting one another, are once again reinforcing their ties, but this time in a very different era shaped by the unpredictability of a second Trump presidency, Israel’s push to remake the region, and changing power structures in the Levant — most notably, and most unpredictably, in Syria.
This realignment is evident in how regional actors are recalibrating their positions on Syria. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar have reengaged with Syria’s new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, the UAE and Egypt have maintained their distance — yet this divide may soon narrow. Egypt has called for an emergency Arab summit at the end of February, a move that signals a growing urgency to present a united Arab front in response to the shifting geopolitical landscape. If al-Sharaa attends, it will mark Syria’s reentry into the Arab fold at a time when regional leaders are trying to assert control over the Palestinian issue before external forces dictate the terms.
The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have historically acted as a financial and political buffer for Jordan, ensuring its stability even during moments of crisis. In turn, Jordan has positioned itself as the steadying force at the intersection of Levantine and Gulf politics. Now, with fears of Palestinian displacement rising and Israel openly challenging Arab sovereignty, these alliances are becoming less about regime survival and more about collective security. The shifts on Syria, and arranging an Arab summit, signal that regional leaders recognize they can no longer afford fragmented approaches — especially as Washington and Tel Aviv push forward with policies that could permanently alter the balance of power in the region.
Abdullah’s upcoming meeting with Trump, as the first with an Arab leader, will serve as a litmus test for how the Arab world plans to navigate a second Trump presidency. Publicly, Jordan is expected to reiterate its opposition to any forced displacement of Palestinians and the dismantling of the peace treaty with Israel if such actions are pursued. Privately, Abdullah is likely to present himself as a proxy for regional powers, insulating Gulf leaders from direct confrontation with Trump while securing Jordan’s own strategic leverage.
This is a critical moment for Jordan. The kingdom has always walked a tightrope between competing pressures from Washington, Tel Aviv, and the broader Arab world. But with the Palestinian issue taking on renewed significance and Israel’s hard-line government seeking irreversible territorial changes, Jordan’s ability to maneuver diplomatically is narrowing, meaning it is turning to other avenues to bargain with America.
Jordan has made it clear over the last 16 months that any attempt to transfer Palestinians into its territory would be considered a declaration of war, directly threatening the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
A crucial factor in this equation is the U.S.-Jordan Defense Cooperation Agreement that expanded U.S. military access to Jordanian bases, originally negotiated during Trump’s first term and later formalized under Joe Biden in 2021. It followed the development over decades of deep institutional ties between Jordan’s security establishment and its American counterparts. These relationships, built through shared strategic interests and extensive defense coordination, have traditionally insulated Jordan from the more unpredictable swings in U.S. political leadership.
But if Washington’s policies become overtly hostile to Jordan’s security concerns, for example in advocating for resettlement of refugees from Gaza, the U.S. military presence could shift from being a strategic asset to a potential liability — and therefore one that Amman may be forced to reconsider. There is growing unease within Jordan’s security establishment about whether the agreement, once seen as a pillar of stability, could become a tool of coercion rather than cooperation.
The durability of these ties will now depend not just on diplomatic goodwill, but on how effectively the U.S. security establishment leverages its own institutional influence in Washington, which is by no means clear-cut at this point. The Pentagon, the intelligence community and other actors within the U.S. security architecture have long viewed Jordan as a critical regional partner — not just for Middle Eastern stability, but for broader U.S. strategic positioning in a region where their options are shrinking. With the U.S. presence facing an uncertain future in Syria and significantly reduced in Iraq since the end of its combat mission in 2021, and amid an uneasy relationship with Turkey, Jordan provides a stable place to station troops. That is, it has until now.
If U.S. aid to Jordan is cut, which is a real possibility under the Trump administration, Jordan has alternative options. The changing situation in Syria will offer Jordan some economic relief: reduced border security costs, increasing trade and renewed water access from the Yarmouk River. Reconstruction efforts in Syria could also provide economic opportunities for Jordanian businesses and workers.
Meanwhile, the Gulf states, the European Union, and the U.K. are likely to step up their support. The Gulf sees Jordan as a stabilizing force, while Trump’s approach to foreign policy — alienating traditional U.S. allies — has given European and British leaders a greater interest in backing Jordan to maintain security access in the region and counter regional instability and migration flows.
More importantly, Jordan’s internal political structure gives it a unique kind of resilience. Unlike other U.S. allies who may face domestic political pressure to accommodate Washington’s demands, Jordan — the monarchy, the security establishment and the public — are aligned on one fundamental issue: survival. Abdullah made this clear when he dismissed financial incentives tied to the “Deal of the Century” in Trump’s first term, stating that no amount of money could buy Jordan’s compliance with policies that threaten its sovereignty, integrity and, more importantly, its existence.
The era of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is changing, not just because of Washington’s shifting priorities but because the very nature of American power is transforming. New technologies, socioeconomic disparities and ideological extremism are reshaping the U.S. from within, making its foreign policy increasingly unpredictable.
This means that governments around the world will have to adapt. Maintaining the status quo with Washington is no longer enough. Jordan has an opportunity to position itself as a core regional power, despite its lack of financial clout, and not just as a mediator but as a pillar of resistance against geopolitical reengineering of the region. This does not mean direct confrontation (an absurdity against the U.S.), but rather leveraging regional alliances, strengthening security autonomy and reducing reliance on Washington’s shifting political landscape and governance structures, a repositioning that in turn harms America’s presence in the region, perhaps giving Jordan a stronger hand in future negotiations.
Those who assume they can simply wait out four years of Trump are missing the larger transformation underway. The changes in Washington’s global engagement are not just about one administration but reflect a deeper structural shift in how the U.S. interacts with its allies. Countries around the world must adapt to avoid dependency on American political whims, which will undoubtedly have knock-on effects that America is not prepared for.
Jordan is unlikely to remain a passive player in U.S. grand strategy. The shifting dynamics of American foreign policy — marked by increasing volatility and transactionalism — seem threatening but also provide Jordan with an unexpected opportunity, namely as a strategic bulwark against the instability of American politics and a regional anchor in an era of global realignment.
“Spotlight” is a newsletter about underreported cultural trends and news from around the world, emailed to subscribers twice a week. Sign up here.