At this year’s Sulaimani Forum, hosted by the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS), it was disheartening to hear Zahra al-Sadr of the Al-Hikma Movement, a Shiite political bloc with roots in Iraq’s clerical establishment, defend child marriage on a public stage. She claimed that Shiites conceive of what she called “early marriage” as a cultural issue. “We don’t approach the topic with propaganda or a view that directly opposes the idea. There is no coercion in such marriages. … It is our culture,” she said.
As an alum of AUIS, I was shocked to hear such harmful rhetoric normalized in a space meant for advancing dialogue and policy. I understood that al-Sadr’s comments represented the view of early marriages in Shiite tradition, which does not use the words “minor” or “underage” — standard in human rights discourse — and relies instead on millennia-old definitions of sexual maturity. Yet by presenting her argument in this way, she was using the platform of a liberal institution of higher education, considered one of the country’s best, to justify child marriage.
Like many apologists of this archaic practice, she also dismissed advocacy against child marriage rooted in human rights as Western “propaganda.” Perhaps more harmful to Iraq’s girls, al-Sadr went on to claim that she had benefited from marrying early, presenting herself as a successful example of the practice without clarifying the privileges she had enjoyed by being affiliated with the Al-Hikma Movement, which derives power and representation from a combination of political positioning, historical influence and access to patronage networks, and which helped her arrive at her status in society. Most girls who enter into an early marriage end up forgoing education, careers and public status, not to mention becoming vulnerable to physical, emotional and sexual abuse that ends up defining the rest of their lives — a reality that al-Sadr seemed to ignore.
Her words made me sad and took me back to my own experience growing up in Baghdad, when I briefly came face-to-face with the reality of child marriage. Although I was never at risk of becoming a victim myself, one incident has stayed with me. I was 14, and my high school teacher jolted me out of my childhood innocence when she said to me, “A girl your age would’ve been married and had children by now.” I remember how confused and upset I felt that my value had been reduced to little more than that of a pawn, a voiceless and generic perpetuator of one of society’s ills: remaining an unmarried girl. To hear this echoed again in 2025 — and by a female Iraqi politician, no less — offered a stark reminder that girls’ and women’s rights in Iraq are regressing.
Al-Sadr’s comments hit especially hard because of Iraq’s amended Personal Status Law, which came into effect in February 2025, allowing marriage contracts within the Shiite community to bypass the civil court system. The law has been endorsed by the majority of Shiite clerics with public platforms.
In my Muslim family, female education was deeply valued, and early marriage was seen as a harmful social practice — never encouraged, let alone debated. It was a norm rooted in respect and progress, not something that needed justification in public discourse. Today, however, a troubling shift is taking place: Politicians, clerics, lawyers and social media influencers are increasingly speaking in favor of child marriage. This public endorsement carries weight and is reshaping societal attitudes in ways that threaten decades of quiet progress.
While Shiite jurisprudence has historically permitted child marriage under certain conditions, the issue has long been debated within the tradition and is far from universally accepted. Some Shiite scholars and clerics, especially those with reformist leanings, have raised ethical and social objections to the practice in contemporary contexts. One notable example is the late Lebanese Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who publicly condemned child marriage as incompatible with human dignity and harmful to families and social structures.
Yet a growing number of Shiite clerics on social media have publicly reaffirmed classical rulings that permit the marriage of girls as young as 9, whether in temporary or permanent unions. While they often claim such cases are rare or symbolic, they assert that these rulings are divinely mandated and therefore cannot be questioned or reinterpreted. To justify these positions, some even cite classical sources, such as the cleric Shahid al-Atabi, who references Al-Hurr al-Amili’s “Wasail al-Shia” — one of the most cited sources of Shiite hadith and jurisprudence, which includes a hadith stating, “Among the happiness of a man is that his daughter does not menstruate in his house,” suggesting early marriage is ideal. This growing visibility has contributed to a normalization of child marriage rhetoric in Iraqi public discourse.
Statistics on child marriage worldwide are collected by the Child Marriage Monitoring Mechanism, led by UNICEF, the United Nations agency for children. It estimates that 28% of women currently aged 20 to 24 in the country were first married or in a union before the age of 18. And according to the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, 22% of unregistered marriages involve girls under 14. The rate of child marriage in Iraq, according to Human Rights Watch, has been steadily increasing.
The real-world impact of these theological endorsements is most visible in southern, Shiite-majority governorates. The rate of marriage for girls under 18 is 43.5% in Maysan, 37.2% in Najaf and 36.8% in Karbala — some of the highest rates in Iraq. Such figures indicate that what may be framed as “rare” in religious discourse is, in fact, disturbingly common on the ground.
The Jafari School of Jurisprudence, which draws on the teachings of the Jafari sect and the legal school of Twelver Shiite Islam, is followed by many Shiite Muslims in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran. In Iraq, a 2014 draft bill proposed what was called the “Jafari Personal Status Law” — a sectarian amendment to Iraq’s 1959 Personal Status Law, aimed at regulating marriage, family and inheritance matters for Shiite Muslims (who make up 55-60% of the population) in accordance with Shiite jurisprudence. The bill, which would have allowed girls to be married as young as 8, was regarded as a political stunt and rejected.
In July 2024, a new version of the amendment was introduced, prompting renewed protests, particularly from civil society and women’s rights groups decrying its apparent endorsement of child marriage, its infringement of fundamental human rights and its potential to deepen sectarian divisions within Iraqi society. Unlike the existing unified civil law, this amendment mandates that courts apply both the Shiite and Sunni schools of Islamic law when registering marriages, effectively institutionalizing sectarian legal pluralism and allowing individuals to follow their religious sect’s interpretation of the law.
The personal status code based on the Jafari Shiite school of jurisprudence will be developed and submitted by the Shiite Endowment Scientific Council, part of the institution that works on religious affairs and cultural development of the Iraqi Shiite community, along with the “marjaiyya” (Shiite religious establishment), in collaboration with judges, legal experts and the State Council. Although the code has to comply with the existing provisions of the 1959 Personal Status Law — allowing marriages from age 15 only under special exceptions — child marriages will likely continue as unregistered, or their official registration will be delayed until the legal age is reached.
Although it is framed differently, the issue of child marriage is also present within the Sunni tradition. Classical Sunni jurisprudence, like its Shiite counterpart, does not set a fixed minimum age for marriage and generally allows marriage contracts before puberty, with consummation contingent on physical maturity. However, contemporary Sunni scholars and institutions vary widely in their positions.
In Iraq, Sunni clerics and religious authorities have largely opposed the Personal Status Law amendment of 2024, criticizing it for institutionalizing sectarian divisions and potentially encouraging underage marriages. The Sunni Endowment and Sunni political parties have opted to continue adhering to the existing 1959 law, which sets 18 as the legal age for marriage, with exceptions only in special circumstances and with judicial approval. While some conservative Sunni voices still defend early marriage on theological grounds, there has been less public mobilization in favor of lowering the marriage age compared to recent efforts by Shiite clerical factions. This relative silence, however, does not necessarily imply consensus, and deeper inquiry into intra-Sunni debates remains essential to understanding the broader picture.
David Beckham, a longtime goodwill ambassador for UNICEF advocating for children’s rights around the world, recently captured the sentiment of those of us who feel indignant about the push to normalize child marriage, when he said in a Time magazine interview that his goal was to keep children in education and out of marriages, “I want to see these kids walking around with clothing and not be subject to violence in their homes or in their schools or in their communities.”
A global issue, child marriage is a clear violation of human rights, and legal efforts to ban the practice have been growing. Girls Not Brides reports that, each year, 12 million girls worldwide are married before the age of 18. Although there may be some nuance in what child marriage looks like across countries, the practice is rooted in gender discrimination and the legal and social frameworks that follow from it. These cases are united by the negative consequences for girls who are forced to become child brides.
Many countries set the legal age of marriage younger for girls than boys, and girls are five to 20 times more likely to get married as children, making it an issue that disproportionately affects girls. The harmful effects of child marriage on young girls are well documented, ranging from physical and psychological trauma to lifelong socioeconomic disadvantages.
The sub-Saharan Africa region has the highest rates of child marriage, and an estimated 130 million women in the region today were married before the age of 18. In Indonesia, around 1 in 9 girls are married before the age of 18. Child marriage is also prevalent in Central and South Asia. Although it is illegal in Bangladesh, half of girls there are married before the age of 18, while in Pakistan the rate is 18%.
Iraq has among the highest child marriage rates in the Middle East and North Africa, along with Egypt, Iran, Sudan and Yemen. In Iran, where the current legal age for girls to be married is 13, estimates suggest that 2.3 million women in the country were married before the age of 15. These marriages have also been linked to cultural and social norms, and efforts to raise the minimum age to 16 have been rejected.
Although child marriage has declined in Egypt, the numbers remain high. According to the 2017 census, 1 in 20 of the country’s girls between the ages of 15 and 17 were in marriages, which are typically facilitated by imams. Even with legislation criminalizing child marriage in Egypt, there are reports that people have been circumventing it with impunity.
The increase in child marriages has been linked with forced marriage more generally, as well as rising poverty, conflict, displacement and human trafficking in the region. Efforts by feminist movements and nongovernmental organizations to eliminate child marriage in Arab countries, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories, have had limited success. One exception, perhaps, is Kuwait, which recently raised the minimum age of marriage to 18, regardless of religious or sectarian legal interpretations.
Child marriages are not only prevalent in the Global South. Although rare, they also happen in the United States, where they are still legal in most states. As of July 2025, 16 U.S. states and two territories have banned child marriage, along with the District of Columbia. The U.K. raised the minimum age for marriage in England and Wales to 18, a rule that entered into force in 2023, and Germany passed the “Act to Protect Minors in Foreign Marriages” last year, setting the legal age for marriage at 18 without any exceptions.
The context in every country is different. In the U.S., many states have what are called “Romeo and Juliet” laws, which protect minors close in age from being unjustly penalized for having consensual sex. Discussions around child marriage in the U.S. have also centered around the country’s policies overseas, adolescent autonomy, consent and reproductive rights. Arguments against human rights standards and the criminalization of marriages under 18 often cite girls’ agency, the destigmatizing of adolescent sexuality and local contexts, framing Romeo and Juliet laws as the least bad of a limited set of options to address hardship and constraints.
When registered as a legal contract, marriage can also offer rights, protections and responsibilities, depending on how each country defines it. Where child marriages do occur, applying punitive measures might heighten the risk to girls and compound the negative effects of the practice. The ultimate goal, research shows, should not be to merely ban child marriage on paper without addressing the root causes. Laws and systems need to be put in place to protect girls and make them aware of the harms of early marriage while also allowing them bodily autonomy, access to health care services, and educational and economic opportunities.
While cases of marriage or pregnancy among older adolescents — those between the ages of 16 and 19 — are more commonly seen or reported, much less public attention is given to marriages involving younger adolescents and other children. Yet girls in these younger age groups face even greater risks, including complications from early pregnancy and childbirth, higher maternal mortality and loss of access to education.
Research shows that intimate partner violence is higher among adolescent girls and women who married as children. Although laws on the age of consent and statutory rape in the U.S. can vary from state to state, federal laws criminalize various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation. There are also laws regarding internet safety and child protection, such as the Children’s Internet Protection Act, for guarding children from explicit or harmful content.
Despite global efforts and increasing awareness, the Iraqi case remains particularly troubling, exemplifying how the entrenchment of religious authority within legal and political systems can dangerously blur the line between cultural tradition and human rights violations. In Iraq, the normalization of child marriage is not merely a by-product of poverty or instability — it is actively reinforced by clerics, lawmakers and media platforms that wield religion as both a justification and a shield.
What begins as a jurisprudential debate over “early marriage” quickly spirals into a public discourse that legitimizes sexual acts with young girls, often under the guise of religious freedom or cultural modesty. The resulting legal ambiguity, clerical impunity and media amplification of such views expose a deeper institutional failure — one in which the state’s unwillingness to confront religious power leaves girls especially vulnerable.
Iraq’s trajectory serves as a sobering warning of what happens when sacred texts are invoked to silence dissent and codify abuse, rather than protect the dignity and safety of its youngest citizens. There are sociopolitical, legal and cultural forces that allow this harmful practice to persist, and urgent reforms are needed.
In Iraq, “early marriage” usually occurs when young girls marry older boys or adult men, often under pressure from family members. This phenomenon is not new in Iraqi society; it also happens among the Kurdish community. Although the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has made progress to prevent child marriage by identifying it as a form of domestic violence, the law still allows exceptions for marriage beginning at age 16. Yet since Iraqis can easily travel to other governorates where child marriages can be arranged, formally or informally, the laws that prohibit them can be circumvented. Across Iraq, deteriorating economic and security conditions have further contributed to the increase in child marriages over the years. The Personal Status Law currently allows exceptions for girls who are 15, contingent on “lawful maturity and physical capacity.” In practice, this is typically assessed by a judge based on signs of puberty and perceived ability to bear children. However, there are no standardized medical or psychological evaluations, leaving the criteria vague and highly discretionary. Tribal and religious leaders have encouraged such marriages using religious and cultural justifications, usually presenting them as positive outcomes in a conservative society.
Religious leaders and politicians use the term “early marriage” without mentioning specific age groups, and avoid terms like “underage” or “minor.” For example, the Iraqi Shiite cleric and politician Ammar al-Hakeem has been known to encourage early marriage to fulfill one’s religious duty. In Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, the slain secretary-general of Hezbollah, once said that those who oppose early marriage are doing the devil’s work. The practice is often presented as a form of protection for females. Shiite cleric Hadi al-Madrasi defended early marriage in a recent podcast episode, telling an interviewer that a woman “who isn’t married will be looked at differently, everyone who sees her might desire her, especially in our societies. … When we have early marriage, we lock the door of [men’s] greed for women.”
Religious conservatives oppose sex outside of marriage, and cultural norms — often dependent on socioeconomic and sectarian backgrounds — can dictate that the honor and reputation of a female and her family are best guarded when she is married. In a culture where both conversations around sex education and access to contraceptives outside the framework of family planning for married couples are usually nonexistent, early marriage for underage girls, which requires the approval of the girl’s father, is perceived as a more acceptable form of modesty. A common saying in Iraqi society — “marry her young and raise her” — suggests that an adult male should marry an adolescent female, molding her personality at a young age and shaping her behavior in a household he controls.
The July 2024 amendment to the Personal Status Law fails to clearly define the stance of Sunni and Shiite jurisprudence on child marriage, instead delegating that authority to religious endowments at a later stage, leaving wide gaps open for subjective or extreme interpretations.
Sherri Talabani, the president and director of SEED Foundation, a nongovernmental organization in the Kurdistan region, says that “once you take it outside the court to issue a marriage certificate and you put it in the religious services, then we don’t know what age girls and boys will be married.”
The age at which marriage contracts can be permissible, according to Shiite jurisprudence, is 9 for girls and 15 for boys. Many people still conduct marriages for girls as young as 12, and these unregistered marriages are facilitated by clergymen. A BBC investigation in 2019 found that so-called temporary marriages — known as “mutah” or “pleasure” marriages and defined as a pre-agreed contract that permits sexual relations for a time in return for money or gifts — have become a lucrative business for the clerics who facilitate them. These contracts are not legally recognized under Iraqi civil law and, critics say, can be akin to prostitution and human trafficking, especially when they involve underage girls and only allow men to dissolve them. A recent documentary aired on Rudaw, a prominent Kurdish media channel based in the KRI, showed that some licensed clerics perform child marriages outside the court, sometimes with only verbal agreements.
Supporters of the law from the Shiite community often cite the jurisprudence of Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Shiite Imam. Some also rely on rulings by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, particularly from his book “Tahrir al-Wasilah,” and by Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in his book “Minhaj al-Salihin,” which permits marrying girls as young as 9, whether in permanent or temporary unions. Khomeini’s book also controversially states that “there is, however, no objection in other enjoyments like touching lasciviously, hugging and rubbing the thighs, even with a suckling infant.” This view is echoed in the writings of Iraqi Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani, notably in his book also titled “Minhaj al-Salihin.” In 2019, Sistani released a statement to disavow underage marriage, saying parts of his rulings have been erased from his current books.
Additionally, proponents from both Sunni and Shiite sects often reference Sahih al-Bukhari, a widely accepted collection of hadiths, which includes a narration that the Prophet Muhammad married his wife Aisha at 6 and consummated the marriage when she was 9. Those advocating for the Personal Status Law amendment frequently cite Sahih al-Bukhari as a legitimate foundation for marriage laws today. Yet a recent study challenges the widely accepted narrative of Aisha’s young age at marriage, suggesting that it was an eighth-century fabrication, potentially politically motivated, and not grounded in historical fact.
For many of the law’s conservative Shiite proponents, the arguments made by supportive clerics are persuasive, largely because critics often focus on the legal and social repercussions of the amendment, rather than directly confronting the political authority of these religious figures. Those who do question the influence of the marjaiyya or the broader role of religion in Iraqi politics risk harsh backlash from conservative segments of society. Individuals who dare to criticize Iraq’s religious institutions — particularly the Shiite clerical leadership — are frequently targeted and discredited by the leadership’s supporters.
In today’s media landscape, Iraqis have unprecedented access to religious material through television and social media. Videos of clerics discussing the permissibility of underage marriage are readily available on platforms like YouTube and Facebook. In televised debates and online forums, clerics and lawyers delve into the practicalities of how the proposed law would be implemented in Iraq. They raise questions such as: Can a 9-year-old girl legally give consent? How are the Islamic concepts of “rushd” (maturity of judgment) and “bulugh” (puberty) defined, and who has the authority to assess these criteria? Does the new amendment explicitly or implicitly permit child marriage?
Last year, a debate hosted by the journalist Muna Sami aired on the Iraqi TV channel Alrabiaa, under the title “Dialectic Argument on the Amendment of the Personal Status Law Between Sharia and Secularism.” The episode featured two clerics — Sheikh Mustafa al-Bayati, representing the Sunni sect, and Sheikh Mohammed Ridha al-Saidi, representing the Shiite sect — discussing proposed amendments to the law. During the exchange, the host posed a provocative question: “If a father wants to marry off his 9-year-old daughter, is it halal (permissible)?” Saidi, representing the Shiite perspective, responded without hesitation: “Yes, not a problem, if she is physically able.” The host continued: “When an underage girl is married, the husband who legally married her is allowed thighing, touching, kissing and to sexually desire her and she is still a child?”
Opponents of the law are often dismissed and denounced by proponents on TV and social media platforms. Saidi labeled any dissenter “fasiq” (immoral or corrupt) for rejecting a ruling that he considers it a “wajib” (obligation) to regard as divine. The prominent Shiite cleric Rasheed al-Hussaini went further, accusing critics of being irreligious and declaring: “A bunch of corrupt men and women want to decide for us as religious people how to manage our personal status laws … we want God’s law.”
In another televised debate, this time on Al-Rasheed TV, the lawyer Qamar al-Samarai sparked widespread attention on social media with her sharp retort: “Don’t act like a sheikh and preach to me.” Her remarks came during a heated exchange in which she voiced firm opposition to the proposed amendment. Facing off against two male panelists who supported the law, Samarai questioned their selective application of Islamic rulings. She challenged them to explain why, if they truly advocated for strict Sharia implementation, they had not called for the legal enforcement of other Islamic prohibitions — such as bans on alcohol or “hadd” (mandatory) punishments for adultery and theft — that are not applied in Iraq.
Opponents argue that underage or child marriage constitutes pedophilia, child rape and sexual abuse, and they criticize proponents for ignoring or downplaying these realities. On an episode of “Jaafar Talk,” which airs on the German broadcaster DW, the host repeatedly referenced international human rights standards on the protection of children — standards that were dismissed outright by Shiite cleric Ali al-Sharifi, who defended his stance by saying that, even at 13 or 14, a girl can marry, citing Sharia law.
In a similar televised debate with the host Adnan al-Tai on UTV, a popular independent Iraqi channel launched in 2020, the Shiite cleric Noor al-Saidi defended the amendment by reframing public concerns, claiming the real issue people have with the law revolves around divorce and child custody. “Believe me, marriages are happening at every age, and the subject is accepted in society, and customs do not change,” he said. He has also justified the concept of “infant thighing” in Shiite ruling, known as “mufaakhathah,” by saying that marrying girls as children to adult men can be beneficial in some cases as long as no sexual intercourse occurs.
This tension was evident on “Albasheer Show,” also on DW, when the host, Ahmed Albasheer, denounced the debate with Sami as a “dirty discussion” and interviewed two female lawyers who oppose the law, sparking widespread criticism from proponents on social media. Shiite cleric Ammar al-Shwale responded by citing Sunni sources that have similar rulings. In any modern society, an open debate on the permissibility of sexual acts with minors in the context of culture and religion can easily be interpreted as a disturbing normalization — if not outright promotion — of pedophilia.
It’s important to note that major digital platforms are increasingly taking steps to restrict content related to promoting child marriage. For example, Instagram now displays a warning message when users search for terms like “underage marriage,” while ChatGPT will flag queries it deems as potentially violating its usage policies. In a notable case last year, Facebook’s Oversight Board ordered the removal of a video showing a 14-year-old girl in Iran being prepared for her wedding, citing concerns that the post facilitated child marriage.
To understand why Iraq, along with its clergy, continues to fail its women and children, we must examine the intersection of religion, politics and law. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the power vacuum that followed the fall of the regime was filled by sectarian parties, and religious authority has contributed to the gradual erosion of civil protections, particularly for women and girls. Rather than serving as moral guardians, many clerics and politicians use religious rhetoric to justify harmful practices such as child marriage, reinforcing the idea that a female’s worth is tied to her marital status and sexual availability as perceived through a patriarchal lens.
Religion has been used as a tool to advance political interests, and opposition to religious authority and the political elites is often discredited and labeled as Western influence. Legal ambiguity, weak enforcement and societal pressure further encourage the practice.
In a 2024 article, Balsam Mustafa called this a “hybrid” system: “On the surface, there is a ‘state’ with a constitution, despite its contradictions and gaps, a formal ballot box, and fragile institutions. A state that ratifies and signs international treaties and conventions, especially those related to the protection of women and children (without abiding by or implementing them), while, deep down, the arms of religious authority are moving and extending in multiple directions to impose their authority through various semi-official or informal means, with girls and women as its primary targets.”
Iraqi courts often defer to a sect-based interpretation of Sharia law, and the state avoids challenging clerical power for fear of political fallout. In effect, religious interpretations are not only shaping private lives, they are writing public policy, often at the expense of the country’s most vulnerable groups.
Compounding these failures is the media’s growing role as both a platform and an amplifier for extremist religious discourse. Rather than challenge clerical overreach or interrogate harmful legal reforms, many Iraqi media outlets provide a stage for male religious figures to publicly justify child marriage under the guise of jurisprudence.
These debates — framed as moral or theological dialogues — rarely include the voices of child marriage survivors. They are almost always portrayed as conservative clergy and men going against liberal women and human rights advocates, reinforcing an environment in which male harmful practices are normalized and female dissent is vilified. The media’s passive or complicit stance has turned the airwaves into an ideological battleground, further deepening societal divisions and leaving women and children with little protection from either culture or the law.
Cultural relativism, the view that social norms must be viewed within the context of their own culture no matter how far removed they are from international human rights norms or globally accepted ethical standards, is often invoked around discussions of tradition or religious custom, but it should not be used as a shield for harmful cultural practices, particularly those that endanger children and women. There must be a clear line drawn between cultural respect and upholding fundamental human rights. Any content circulating in public forums that normalizes sexual acts with minors must be unequivocally condemned and removed. Public debates that frame such acts as religiously or culturally acceptable are not simply controversial — they are dangerous.
Amid these legal and theological inquiries, a far more fundamental question is often left unaddressed: On what basis do these clerics derive their legitimacy, and what makes their particular interpretations of Islamic law valid? In Iraqi society, religious officials are often seen as “respectable” by virtue of their positions and thus presumed to possess deep knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. Iraq must foster a culture in which sensitive topics like child abuse and pedophilia are not justified, promoted or legitimized. While thinking about sexual attraction to minors is not a crime, acting on it — especially with the belief that it is permissible — can cause severe physical and mental damage to victims.
Despite claims that early childhood marriages are rare and can be consensual or beneficial to girls in Iraq, the mere social acceptance of such practices, even if not fully enacted in law, encourages abuse and allows proponents to find loopholes in the legal system to practice what they believe is their religious right. It is little wonder that Iraq ranks among the lowest on the Georgetown Institute’s Women, Peace and Security Index.
The ongoing debates on underage or child marriage in Iraq, especially those involving religious figures and politicians, expose a deeper societal issue and the increasing power of clergy in public life. The international community and Iraqi civil society must continue to pressure lawmakers and religious leaders to reject these practices.
Iraq could implement laws that protect women and children from domestic violence and improve the quality of — and access to — education, while providing more opportunities for women to enter the labor market. It remains to be seen whether Iraqi society will challenge harmful radical interpretations of what is permissible, just as it has been rejecting extremist ideologies like those of the Islamic State group. While social norms may take time to change, monitoring and censorship of harmful content can change perceptions and attitudes.
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