While all attention has been on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) mobilizing its military assets to attack Israel in response to the assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, another key arm of the IRGC — its psychological warfare apparatus — has already been fully operationalized. And yet it has received barely any attention.
In the past two weeks, numerous intelligence reports cited in Western media have suggested Haniyeh’s killing was the direct result of Mossad infiltration at the highest levels of the IRGC’s security and intelligence apparatus. However, the IRGC was very quick and firm in its rejection of these reports. Instead, it claims the assassination was the product of a short-range projectile being fired from outside the protected compound.
Although this official narrative in and of itself severely indicts the capabilities of the IRGC’s security and intelligence — which was always depicted as the creme de la creme of the regime’s military machinery — it is far less damaging and embarrassing than reports of high-level infiltration.
The speed of the IRGC’s rebuttal and efforts to discount reports of infiltration, which have been relatively successful, was anything but a coincidence. Rather, it was the work of a new commander in the IRGC’s psychological and propaganda wing — a figure who has held his role for just three weeks.
On July 24, Mohammad Ali Naini — one of the most senior IRGC experts on psychological warfare and soft war — was selected as the IRGC’s new spokesperson and deputy for public relations and publications. Naini’s appointment came upon the orders of the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, rather than the commander-in-chief, Hossein Salami. Its significance in terms of bringing change to the IRGC’s approach is underscored by the fact that Naini’s predecessor, Ramazan Sharif, held the position for more than 18 years.
An assessment of Naini’s expertise and experience in the context of the responsibilities of his role as deputy for public relations reveals a lot about the future trajectory of the IRGC. His appointment is a clear indication that the supreme leader’s office is preparing to step up the IRGC’s psychological warfare operations and intends to better coordinate control over its propaganda, communications and PR operations.
But first, to be able to properly grasp the significance of Naini’s role, it is essential to understand the unique status of his position and its place in the chain of command, which is entirely unconventional by Western military standards.
While the deputy for public relations officially sits under the supervision of the IRGC’s commander-in-chief as established by the IRGC’s charter, in practice the position is directly under the authority of the Office of the Supreme Leader. Aware of the importance of propaganda and psychological warfare, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei brought this deputy position, as well as the political deputy, directly under his control via his clerical representative when he assumed the supreme leadership of the Islamic Republic in 1989.
Since then, the deputy has, in practice, been housed in the IRGC’s political arm, which is headed by the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC, the hard-line cleric Sadeghi. This structure provides Khamenei and his all-powerful office total control over propaganda and soft war operations, with the ability to micromanage their every aspect.
To the untrained eye, the role of deputy for public relations and publications may not appear particularly significant, but a closer examination of its responsibilities reveals that its mandate is far more important than the position sounds.
The position serves as one of the most important cogs in the IRGC’s propaganda, cognitive and psychological warfare apparatus. All official IRGC communications and external publications are under the control of the deputy, who is also responsible for “targeted and effective coordination” with all Iranian cultural, propaganda and media organizations, such as state TV and radio and other news agencies. Such communication is intended to always emphasize the “comprehensive readiness of the IRGC and Basij militia to selflessly and courageously confront threats and any aggression of foreign powers” and propagate the “spirit of service and dedication of the IRGC and Basij in defense of the values and ideals of the regime, the revolution and the Islamic homeland.” But as well as being focused on the IRGC’s own PR, the deputy is also responsible for the strategy behind psychological, cognitive and propaganda operations designed to undermine, discredit and attack the Islamic Republic’s foreign and domestic enemies. This is achieved through directing and shaping the IRGC-affiliated news agencies, such as Tasnim, Fars News and Javan News.
The multiple intelligence failures and embarrassments of the past few years have clearly undermined these objectives. This is precisely the reason why Khamenei’s office has changed its personnel.
Although the IRGC, both at home and abroad, has increasingly made cognitive and psychological warfare a focal point, the office of the public relations deputy had received significant criticism for underperforming in this regard. Sharif, the former deputy, was known to be reactive and was neither a strategist nor a specialist in psychological warfare. This is precisely what the supreme leader intended to remedy through Naini’s appointment to the role.
Naini is one of the founding architects of the IRGC’s soft war, psychological warfare and cognitive warfare doctrines. He has more than 40 years of experience in these fields, having held numerous senior posts. These include serving as the IRGC’s cultural deputy and the Basij’s cultural and social deputy — two key positions responsible for overseeing propaganda and soft war activities. He has also been a senior member of various key commissions, involved in strategizing propaganda and cognitive warfare operations against the regime’s foreign enemies and Iranian dissidents domestically. These include the Commission for Psychological Operations, the Psychological Operations and Social Affairs Commission of the National Police Force Command (a post he held for over 10 years), the Supreme National Security Council’s Commission for Media and the Policymaking Council for Defense Propaganda. Naini has also been a senior strategist across the IRGC’s propaganda and media arms, having been chair of the board at the Javan newspaper as well as part of the policymaking councils of Fars News and Tasnim News. Two books published by Naini — “The Principles of Soft War” and “Propaganda and Psychological Operations” — have served as key texts that have shaped the IRGC’s doctrines.
The injection of new blood — as many have joined or been replaced — across the IRGC’s apparatus through Naini’s appointment was a decision that was shaped by the increasing external and internal threats faced by the regime, not least the IRGC. These challenges include damage to the IRGC’s own reputation and image following its role in brutally suppressing the 2022 protests, its designation as a terrorist organization by increasing numbers of Western governments, its successive humiliations and a desire for increased psychological warfare due to rising anti-regime sentiment in Iran and regional escalation. Naini himself has already laid out his priorities to “expand the scope” of the IRGC’s propaganda operations and has described directing public opinion as “one of the main components of power.” In doing so, he has already indicated a more hands-on approach to coordinating and controlling broader media in the Islamic Republic, making it clear to journalists that their “main mission” is “protecting national spirit and confronting the enemies’ media operations.”
The appointment of Naini reveals the direction of travel for the IRGC. The speed with which Naini asserted himself to limit the damage to the IRGC following reports that foreign infiltration was responsible for Haniyeh’s assassination gives an indication of the aggressive approach to propaganda and cognitive war the IRGC will take under his tenure. Unlike Sharif, Naini will not hold back from imposing his control on the communication and public relations apparatuses of other IRGC bodies to infuse psychological operations into every aspect of IRGC communications. His aim will be to improve the IRGC’s reputation and credibility as an effective and loyal Islamist armed force committed to the supreme leader. For now, however, as the IRGC and its network of proxies prepare to launch an attack on Israel and likely on U.S. forces in the region, Naini has operationalized the IRGC’s soft war apparatus to simultaneously wage a psychological war against Israel and the West. In his own words, “The Islamic Republic of Iran has not yet responded militarily, but the Zionists are psychologically terrified.” While this may be wishful thinking from Naini, his focus will be making the fear of an attack worse than the attack itself.
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