In the command center, a few miles behind Ukrainian lines, banks of monitors display live drone feeds of the battlefield below. One shows three Russian soldiers moving from tree line to tree line. The Ukrainian commander notes their position. A few minutes later, a large bomber drone heads to the Russians’ position. The Russians fear the unmanned vehicle, calling it “Baba Yaga,” the witch of Slavic folklore. It hovers above the tree boundary, searching for soldiers with its thermal vision camera before dropping four mortar rounds, which detonate on impact. The deadly cargo delivered, the drone switches off its cameras and automatically flies back to its recovery point.
“You get to watch death in real time,” one of the commanders in the operations center observed dryly. They will call in another strike on the position, just to make sure.
The drone is operated by one of Ukraine’s most elite units, the 3rd Assault Brigade. The battle-hardened contingent is one of the country’s most efficient, formed of veterans who have taken part in the war’s fiercest battles, from Bakhmut to Avdiivka.
New Lines was given access to its operations in the east of Ukraine for a week and a half, conducting interviews with its soldiers, observing combat operations from its command center and overseeing the training of new recruits. This access came at a critical time for Ukraine. Russia continues to press Ukrainian defenses hard in the east of the country, while the administration of Donald Trump attempts to forge a peace deal. Such efforts have stalled amid the red carpet pageantry of last month’s Alaska summit, the curiously capitalized recriminations flooding the president’s social media feed and the cheery confusion of his special envoy, Steve Witkoff.
European proposals to provide future security guarantees to Ukraine are similarly mired in uncertainty, with Moscow refusing to countenance the presence of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil and Europeans unsure of how many they would be prepared to deploy in the first place.
Kyiv therefore sees its best hope for both holding off the Russian invasion and deterring a future assault as reforming, expanding and rearming its own military. In the oft-repeated words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, “Ukraine must become a steel porcupine, indigestible for potential invaders.” Most of its quills must be homegrown.
In response, the Ukrainian military has launched its most sweeping reforms since Russia’s full-scale invasion, shifting from a brigade-based structure to a corps-level system built around its most capable units. The newly formed 3rd Army Corps, established in March 2025, is expected to grow to roughly 40,000 personnel — nearly four times the size of a standard brigade. These reforms aim to correct a persistent weakness in Ukraine’s armed forces: breakdowns in command and control.
Early results suggest the changes are working. According to Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov, average monthly casualties have fallen by about half since the 3rd Army Corps was created. He attributes much of this improvement to significantly enhanced command and control: “Chaos on the front line has disappeared; units are being introduced into battle in an orderly manner. … Dishonesty in situation reports among commanders at all levels within the corps has disappeared, and coordination has improved.”
The 3rd Army Corps has been formed around the 3rd Assault Brigade, which was founded by Azov veterans who were outside Mariupol at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The brigade quickly evolved into one of Ukraine’s most professional and prestigious fighting units, despite being among the newest. Its soldiers played a key role in the battle for Bakhmut, the site of some of the most intense urban combat since World War II’s Battle of Stalingrad. Russian forces spent over 10 months and suffered an estimated 100,000 casualties to seize Bakhmut.
Coordination between brigades positioned side by side on the front line is often alarmingly poor, with some commanders refusing to communicate or cooperate entirely. On multiple occasions, the 3rd Assault Brigade has found neighboring units retreating without orders, warnings or even prior notice, leaving their positions exposed. The only signal comes when Russian troops suddenly emerge on what was assumed to be a secure flank.
“Previously, the brigades to our left and right didn’t have to listen to us,” said Vitaly, a senior sergeant in the 3rd Assault and our escort. “They’re not required to coordinate with us during counteroffensives. They don’t want to risk men or materiel, even if it would help the broader situation.”
The absence of centralized command, he added, has resulted in “a billion disasters.”
Several of Russia’s recent advances were entirely avoidable. The most notable occurred near Ocheretyne in April 2024, when a botched handover between two Ukrainian brigades allowed Russian forces to seize 3 miles of territory within hours. The aftermath was marked by finger-pointing and recriminations over who was to blame. In response, the Ukrainian military leadership began implementing a unified command structure, placing all brigades operating within the same sector under a single, centralized authority.
The 60th Mechanized Brigade was the first to be integrated into the 3rd Army Corps. The first order of business: All personnel were sent for retraining near the front lines.
“I’ve learnt more in three days than in 45 days at Desna,” said a soldier from the 60th Mechanized who goes by the nom de guerre Mutnye, referring to the major training base just north of Kyiv. “Most of our basic training consisted of chopping wood. Yes, it’s crazy.”
Mutnye also said that he received a mere four hours of tactical medicine training each week as part of his earlier basic training, grossly inadequate for the type of war he was fighting, in which almost every soldier either gets wounded or has to care for a wounded comrade. “What can you learn in four hours?” he asked rhetorically.
Soldiers who join the 3rd Assault are significantly better trained. New recruits undergo 45 days of basic training, which is run by instructors with combat experience, before being assigned to a unit, where they typically undergo an additional five weeks of specialized unit training. In contrast to large centers such as Desna, which are still frustratingly Soviet in mentality, the majority of the brigade’s training is conducted using NATO standards, albeit adjusted to the realities of the current war and the truncated nature of the course. Roughly half of the brigade’s basic training is dedicated to combat medicine, and its medics are considered some of the best in Ukraine. “It enabled me to save the lives of three people,” said Sasko, a veteran of the Finnish military and now a sergeant in the brigade’s 1st Assault Infantry Battalion. He adds that a fourth person — himself — was also saved. A remarkable 85% of all wounded soldiers from the 3rd Assault return to active service.
One of these is “Corvo,” an amiable 24-year-old and a relatively new recruit. He was part of an assault team in Avdiivka that was targeted by enemy artillery. The opening Russian barrage struck the dugout where Corvo’s platoon commander and combat medic were stationed, killing the former and incapacitating the latter. Corvo received a severe shrapnel wound to his abdomen, but the high level of medical training he and his comrades received kept him alive. He did his five weeks of basic training in the United Kingdom, as part of Operation Interflex, the British-led multinational training program that began in July 2022, and speaks very highly of his instructors from the Royal Marines. Even with his Western training, which Corvo compared to the “complete shit” provided at Desna, the brigade put him through an additional 45 days of unit training before he was allowed to participate in combat. “When I came back from England, I arrived at our positions, and our guys were picking up their gear and heading out on an assault,” he said. “I wanted to go too! But I hadn’t done my additional unit training so they told me, ‘No, you will guard the gate.’”
Back at the training ground, soldiers of the 60th Mechanized Brigade are drilling tactical movement — specifically, how to cross open terrain safely. The sessions begin with classroom instruction, followed by live field practice. Rifles in hand, the troops move across the dirt as instructors scrutinize every step. Every element of the newly integrated brigade is undergoing retraining — from front-line infantry to senior commanders.
These are not raw recruits. Most are combat veterans, many having fought in Bakhmut and during the Kherson counteroffensives. They understand the life-or-death value of what’s being taught. They listen carefully, take notes and ask pointed questions.
At the armor training ground, a few miles away, we met crews from the 60th Brigade, practicing navigation and group maneuvers in their hulking ex-Soviet infantry fighting vehicles. Under their previous leadership, they had only been trained in the basics of maneuvering; today they are learning battlefield navigation and group armored tactics. All of it is new. “Our previous training was very basic, we were just taught how to drive the vehicle,” the commander said.
The leader of the course, who goes by the call sign “Eugene,” is an experienced tank commander who throws his 13-ton BMP infantry fighting vehicle around the training ground like a rally driver. All of the combat instructors here are veterans, just one example of the meritocratic nature of the brigade. An incompetent person getting promoted due to political connections or bribery — an endemic problem in other parts of the Ukrainian military — is rare in the 3rd Assault.
“All of our officers were initially infantry,” Corvo said, noting that this creates respect among the rank and file who are being taught by men who have done exactly what they expect their recruits to be doing. Camaraderie and morale are vital intangible factors, alongside physical necessities like supplies and ammunition, that make any army function or fail. The 3rd Assault prides itself on ensuring the enlisted, noncommissioned officers and officers all get along, even if that means shirking formalities of protocol. Members of the brigade address each other as “friend” (in Ukrainian, “druzhe”) and greet each other with a handshake regardless of rank. It helps that those proffering the outstretched hand are often national heroes.
Lt. Col. Kyrylo Berkal, known by his call sign “Kirt,” serves as both the architect of the brigade’s — and now the entire army corps’ — combat training and its deputy commander. He has been at war with Russia since 2014, when Vladimir Putin sent unmarked “little green men” into Crimea and deployed intelligence and combat operatives into Donbas to ignite a so-called separatist insurgency.
At the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kirt was in Mariupol, where he took part in the now-mythologized defense of the Azovstal steel plant — a David-and-Goliath stand that has become emblematic of Ukrainian resistance. When the Ukrainian government ordered the garrison to surrender, Kirt was taken prisoner by Russian forces. Like most of the Ukrainians captured that day, he endured months of torture in captivity.
He was initially held at Olenivka, where an independent United Nations investigation concluded the Russian forces shelled their own prisoner-of-war camp, killing between 53 and 62 Ukrainian captives. When Kirt was released as part of a prisoner exchange in September 2022, he underwent months of rehabilitation. At no point, he said, did he doubt he would eventually rejoin the fight.
When New Lines met Kirt at one of the brigade’s firing ranges, he was running drills alongside his men. On his hip hung a gleaming silver Colt Python .357 Magnum. “It’s Dirty Harry’s gun,” he said with a broad grin. The pistol — one of only two in the country — was awarded to him by the Ukrainian government for exceptional service. It’s not just for show, either. Kirt drew the weapon several times during the session, hitting man-sized targets at 50 yards with ease.
The impact of the reforms — and 3rd Assault’s attitude toward the importance of training — is already being felt on the battlefield, Kirt said, pointing to the lack of Russian success in their sector. Whereas other Ukrainian military formations are steadily falling back, 3rd Army Corps is holding the line. “We’re holding approximately 150 km [93 miles] of front line,” he explained, adding that the area represents around one-eighth of the total front. “We are conducting a large-scale defensive operation and have successfully repelled the Russian advance on the final defensive line of the Donbas.”
Much of the brigade’s success, Kirt explained, stems from the forward-thinking, “Western” mindset of its trainers — an approach still largely absent in much of the Ukrainian military, which remains burdened by entrenched Soviet-era doctrines that continue to cast a long shadow.
“The legacy of Soviet command culture still hampers the effective adoption of modern methods across virtually all areas of the military,” Kirt said. “What the military needs is a modern, creative approach to training — led by instructors with real combat experience and proven leadership on the battlefield.” He cites Stanley McChrystal, former commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, as a particular inspiration. “Our military needs to become a ‘Team of Teams,’” he said, referencing McChrystal’s bestselling book on military and organizational leadership.
Kirt is under no illusions that the war will end anytime soon, regardless of the Trump administration’s Kabuki-style “diplomacy” in Alaska.
“The war will end when every Ukrainian sees victory as the goal — and sees themselves as part of the force bringing that victory closer,” he said. “It will end when every citizen contributes as much effort as the men and women currently serving in the 3rd Army Corps.”
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