The Colombian government has been operating in crisis mode for the past several days. On Jan. 26, a diplomatic storm broke out after the country’s president, Gustavo Petro, turned back two flights carrying deported migrants from the U.S., in protest against their treatment by U.S. authorities. He specifically objected to the Colombian migrants being transported in handcuffs aboard military aircraft. “A migrant is not a criminal,” he said.
In response, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed swift and severe sanctions on Colombia: The country would face crippling tariffs, U.S. visas for government officials were revoked and the visa section of the U.S. embassy in Bogota was closed, among other measures. Given that the U.S. is the country’s largest trading partner, many Colombians were worried about their economic livelihoods. The looming threat of a travel ban added to the anxiety of students, workers and tourists reliant on U.S. visas.
The situation was resolved through official channels that same Sunday, with each side framing the resolution in its favor. The Colombian government announced that “the impasse was overcome” and took the additional step of offering the presidential plane to repatriate the deported nationals. Meanwhile, the Trump administration declared victory, releasing a statement asserting that Colombia had fully acquiesced to its demands.
While this incident put Petro in the global spotlight, it overshadowed a storm brewing at home — one that has led the president to declare a state of emergency that grants him extraordinary powers for at least 90 days, including the ability to impose taxes without congressional approval, enact executive orders with the force of law and deploy substantial economic resources.
This crisis is unfolding in the Catatumbo region, in northeastern Colombia. Here, since Jan. 16, guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN) and criminal groups consisting of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) combatants who refused to lay down their arms or resumed fighting after the 2016 peace process have been engaged in violent clashes that have devastated local communities. The rival organizations are battling for control of this strategic territory, prized for its role in drug trafficking and geopolitical importance. The conflict has already claimed the lives of at least 80 people while up to 40,000 civilians have been forcibly displaced from their homes, with these numbers rising daily.
Catatumbo’s geography and climate, combined with the government’s conspicuous absence, make it a critical enclave for various actors in the region. With its thick forests, scenic mountains and diverse ecosystems, Catatumbo is one of Colombia’s top coca-producing areas. According to U.N. figures, Colombia is already the top coca producer in the world, and in this region alone nearly 100,000 acres were cultivated as of 2023. This makes Catatumbo a key hub for criminal organizations involved in the drug trade.
Catatumbo’s location on the border between Colombia and Venezuela heightens its strategic significance. The region serves as a crucial corridor not only for drug trafficking but also for criminal groups crossing into Venezuela, where they collaborate with local authorities to avoid prosecution. Analysts note that armed groups also use Catatumbo’s position for troop movement between northern and southern parts of Colombia, crossing into Venezuelan territory and reentering the country further south, in the state of Arauca, thus evading urban centers and the scrutiny of Colombian authorities.
The history of violence in Catatumbo dates back to the 1970s, when Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups such as the ELN and the FARC established their presence in the region. Things took a particularly brutal turn in the 1990s with the arrival of right-wing paramilitary forces. These groups unleashed colossal violence and terror, targeting anyone suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas. In the early 2000s, several factions of these paramilitary forces demobilized. The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC brought a fleeting sense of relief to the region.
Yet today, the fighting in Catatumbo continues with unprecedented levels of intensity. While previous rounds of violence in the region were driven by clear political motivations — from the liberal-conservative conflict of the 1940s and 1950s to the guerrilla movements of the 1960s through the 1990s, which sought a Cuban-style Communist revolution — political aims are no longer the bloodshed’s primary motive. Groups like the ELN now function as criminal enterprises, motivated almost exclusively by the narcotics trade and other lucrative activities such as illegal mining and extortion.
Communities caught in the crossfire face catastrophic consequences. Armed groups impose their rule through intimidation and forced curfews. Children miss school, and many face forced recruitment into the very same criminal groups that are terrorizing their towns. The current Catatumbo crisis is another grim milestone for Colombia, home to the world’s longest-running internal armed conflict. No single event in Colombia’s recent past has triggered displacement on such a massive scale — a sobering distinction for a nation that has consistently led global rankings for displaced populations.
This humanitarian crisis has become one of the Petro administration’s most critical tests. “Here lies a nation’s failure,” the president declared, suggesting that all administrations — including his own — share responsibility.
When Gustavo Petro became Colombia’s first leftist president, in 2022, he made “total peace” — an ambitious plan to negotiate simultaneously with the country’s array of guerrillas and criminal organizations — his signature promise. To execute this vision, he proposed sweeping land and drug reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of Colombia’s conflict. Central to Petro’s strategy was securing a deal with the ELN, the country’s oldest active guerrilla group. If anything, it was an overly optimistic gambit. Peace talks with the ELN have failed repeatedly since the 1970s, even as former president Juan Manuel Santos managed to broker a historic deal with the FARC in 2016, a much larger and powerful group at the time.
Optimism aside, the need to strike a deal with the ELN isn’t just desirable — it’s essential. Many observers argue that Colombia cannot achieve lasting, comprehensive peace (that is, one that involves the different criminal groups) without the ELN’s participation. This group not only wields significant influence over several parts of the country but also plays a key role in shaping the Colombia-Venezuela relationship. There are growing allegations of complicity between the ELN and the increasingly repressive Maduro regime in Venezuela, including claims that Venezuelan authorities allow the ELN to operate freely across the border.
Formal peace talks between the Petro administration and the ELN began in November 2022, but the path was fraught with setbacks. The negotiations lurched from crisis to crisis, including the notorious kidnapping of the father of Liverpool football star Luis Diaz. Even a year-long ceasefire was futile, as no real progress was made during this time.
In September 2024, the ELN attacked a military base in Arauca, another volatile region on the Venezuelan border. The attack, which killed two soldiers and injured 27, caused talks to collapse temporarily before they resumed in November. But the recent fighting in Catatumbo proved to be the breaking point. On Jan. 17, Petro announced he was pulling the plug on the negotiations once and for all.
“The ELN has chosen the path of war, and war it shall get,” he posted to his X account.
To address the crisis, the government is increasing the number of soldiers in the region. Colombian police, who operate under military command, have joined the country’s armed forces in this effort. Beyond security measures, the government has launched humanitarian relief operations. And on Jan. 28, responding to Petro’s declarations of “economic emergency” and “internal commotion,” officials announced three temporary taxes, including on online betting and exports of petroleum and carbon.
Petro has also appointed a military commander with extraordinary powers to plan and execute operations, coordinate intelligence services and oversee the movement of civilians near oil fields and the border region.
And yet the Catatumbo exodus continues.
Perhaps unexpectedly, the Trump administration’s recent decisions have exacerbated this situation. Washington’s freeze on foreign assistance has grounded Colombia’s fleet of Black Hawk helicopters, which, though owned by Colombia, depend on U.S. financial support for maintenance and operations. These helicopters provide the Colombian army with a crucial tactical advantage over criminal organizations, enabling combat operations without deploying ground forces.
The Catatumbo crisis carries implications beyond its immediate impact on Colombian citizens and politics. Petro’s inability to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations with armed groups may set a precedent for dealing with these organizations across the region and in the future. While certainly different in structure and context, similar criminal groups operate in Mexico. How should countries deal with these criminal organizations? Is peaceful negotiation a chimera?
Ironically, the Trump administration’s policies may prove counterproductive to U.S. interests in the long term. The combination of mass displacement, the suspension of military aid and unchecked criminal activity in drug-producing regions threatens Washington’s professed desire for reduced migration, drug trade prevention and regional stability. Though Colombia has long been Washington’s closest regional ally, the Trump administration’s antagonism may push it to seek strategic partnerships with other actors, both within Latin America and beyond.
In response to the recent spat with the U.S., Petro called for an extraordinary meeting of presidents from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). But Honduran president and CELAC chair Xiomara Castro canceled the summit two days later, citing lack of consensus over the humanitarian crisis in Haiti and the 2024 raid on the Mexican embassy in Ecuador.
Petro declared: “If we’re not wanted in the north, the south must unite.”
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